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DO YOU BELIEVE IN MAGIC?:
SELF-DETERMINATION AND PROCEDURAL




Proponents of the “contemporary mediation movement” promised that
parties would be able to exercise self-determination as they participated in
mediation. When courts began to mandate the use of mediation, commen-
tators raised doubts about the vitality of self-determination. Though these
commentators also suggested a wide variety of reforms, few of their pro-
posals have gained widespread adoption in the courts.
Ensuring the procedural justice of mediation represents another means
to ensure self-determination. If mediation provides parties with the oppor-
tunity to exercise voice, helps them demonstrate that they have considered
what each other had to say, and treats them in an even-handed and digni-
fied manner, it is more likely that the parties will share information that
will lead to a result that actually represents the exercise of their self-
determination.
Recent research, however, counsels that status affects procedural justice
perceptions, voice is not always productive, and parties who are marginal-
ized or lower status may neither expect nor desire to exercise voice.  Fur-
ther, research indicates that even those parties in mediation who value
voice may not value participating in the back-and-forth or bargaining pro-
cess that is required to arrive an agreement.
After reviewing this and other research, the Article proposes the follow-
ing reforms to enhance the likelihood that mediation will provide all parties
with voice, trustworthy consideration and real, substantive self-determina-
tion: increasing the inclusivity of the pool of mediators; training all
mediators to acknowledge and address implicit bias; training mediators to
engage in pre-mediation caucusing that focuses on developing trust; institu-
tionalizing systems for feedback and quality assurance; training mediators
to model reflective listening; adopting online technology that provides par-
ties with pre-mediation information they need to engage in informed deci-
* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. I thank Michael Green
for inviting me to participate in this symposium, Richard Delgado for his inspiration for
the symposium, and Roselle Wissler for her comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
Any error or oversight is mine.
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sion-making and the opportunity for self-analysis and self-reflection; and
perhaps even identifying additional areas of mediation practice in which
mediators would be required to take affirmative steps to avoid unconscion-
able unfairness or coercion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
DREAMS and noble intentions, at least in part, inspired the “con-temporary mediation movement.”1 Many mediation advocates2urged—and continue to urge3—that mediation should be em-
braced and institutionalized because it is an inclusive process and can en-
able people to find paths that allow them to exercise meaningful self-
determination in resolving their disputes. This promise of self-determina-
tion has dimmed, however, as courts and agencies have focused on effi-
ciency as a primary reason to institutionalize mediation,4 as lawyers and
repeat players have come to dominate the issue framing and negotiations
occurring within mediation,5 and as research has revealed that a signifi-
cant percentage of parties do not possess the temperament or desire to
fashion their own unique resolutions.6
As self-determination has lost luster, some mediation advocates have
emphasized mediation’s potential to provide an “experience of justice.”7
Drawing on the vast social–psychological literature regarding procedural
justice, these mediation advocates have urged that the process offers im-
portant opportunities for “voice,” “trustworthy consideration,” and
“even-handed and respectful treatment,” in marked contrast to the
processes used to resolve the vast majority of litigated civil matters—i.e.,
default, lawyers’ bilateral negotiation, and dispositive motions.8 This Ar-
ticle, in part, represents a reminder regarding mediation’s potential to
1. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 1 (1st ed. 1994).
2. This includes the author of this Article.
3. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, JOINT STATE GOV’T
COMM’N, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA: REPORT OF THE ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 12 (2017) (advocating for insti-
tutionalization of mediation in state courts and agencies and in private sector).
4. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Con-
nected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1,
22 (2001) [hereinafter Welsh, The Thinning Vision].
5. See Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” in
Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 865–66 (2008) [hereinafter Riskin
& Welsh, Is that All There Is?]; Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Media-
tion: What’s Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 789 (2001) [hereinafter
Welsh, Making Deals]; Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note 4.
6. See Donna Shestowsky, How Litigants Evaluate the Characteristics of Legal Proce-
dures: A Multi-Court Empirical Study, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 793, 828 (2016) (reporting
research regarding ex ante litigation preferences, specifically that “maintaining veto power
over a third-party suggestion was as much decision control that litigants desired and they
were indifferent between having this type of power and delegating decision-making au-
thority to a third party or group of third parties.”).
7. See Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversa-
tions with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 573, 671 (2004) [hereinafter Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking
Glass]; Nancy A. Welsh, The Current Transitional State of Court-Connected ADR, 95
MARQ. L. REV. 873, 884 (2012) [hereinafter Welsh, The Transitional State]; Nancy A.
Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice System, 5 CAR-
DOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 143 (2004) [hereinafter Welsh, The Place of Mediation].
8. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 5, at 788; Welsh, The Transitional State, supra
note 7.
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provide self-determination and procedural justice and then considers the
fate of proposals that have arisen to reclaim this potential.
But this Article also examines more recent research raising questions
regarding the appropriateness of expecting mediation to deliver self-de-
termination or procedural justice. In particular, the Article examines re-
search indicating that people’s societal identity and status can and does
affect the likelihood that they will perceive procedural justice in media-
tion, their ability and willingness to exercise voice in mediation, and even
their ability and willingness to demonstrate trustworthy consideration.
Members of society who feel marginalized or isolated—or who know that
they exercise no power due to their disadvantageous place within an ex-
treme hierarchy—are less likely to be willing or able to embrace opportu-
nities to express themselves in mediation. To do so represents an
unacceptable risk. Meanwhile, members of society who are powerful—or
who know that they exercise privilege due to their superior place within
an extreme hierarchy—are less likely to be willing or able to embrace
opportunities to hear and acknowledge what other parties have said in
mediation. If mediation lacks participants’ voice and trustworthy consid-
eration, it is difficult to understand how the process can provide either
procedural justice or a meaningful version of self-determination. In other
words, as self-determination and procedural justice meet inequality in
mediation, these noble intentions are found wanting.
It is at this point that it becomes tempting to question the value of
mediation—to label mediation as an innovation that looked promising
but has ended in failure. It is also at this point that the question (and song
title) Do You Believe in Magic? comes to mind. Of course, the answer to
such a question must be “No!” Only a fool believes in magic. But as is so
often true, the lyrics of the song are much more nuanced than the title
would lead us to believe. The lyrics urge us to “believe in [the] magic in a
young girl’s heart” and that music can “free your soul.” The lyrics also
acknowledge that talking about this form of magic is “like trying to tell a
stranger ‘bout-a rock and roll.”9
In other words, it is the hope and creativity in music that are “magic,”
and they must be experienced in order to be felt. There is no doubt that
both of these assertions can be true. Music can overcome all sorts of bar-
riers, inhabiting both the space outside and inside us,10 reaching beyond
the rigorously rational and into the hopefully emotional. It can unlock
individuals’ previously-unacknowledged abilities for expression and free-
dom,11 and when we make music together—or dance together—we can
feel the power of coming together to create something good. Music defi-
9. THE LOVIN’ SPOONFUL, Do You Believe in Magic?, on DO YOU BELIEVE IN
MAGIC (Kama Sutra 1965).
10. See KAREN ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY OF GOD (1993).
11. See Daoud Tyler-Ameen & Lars Gotrich, On Film and Stage, Jonathan Demme
Looked into the Heart of the Song, NPR (Apr. 29, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/
sections/therecord/2017/04/29/526017323/on-film-and-stage-jonathan-demme-looked-into-
the-heart-of-the-song [perma link unavailable].
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nitely has a power, a language, a connecting force—a magic—that can
help us overcome barriers and inhibitions that would otherwise divide us.
So, the answer to the question “Do you believe in magic?” really has to
be both “yes” and “no.”12 It depends.
And so it is with mediation. “It depends” must be the appropriate re-
sponse to the question of whether we should continue to believe in the
potential power of mediation to foster dialogue, procedural justice, and
self-determination. Therefore, this Article will not end with the conclu-
sion that mediation represents a failed experiment, unable to overcome
the negative effects of inequality, bias, and prejudice. Instead, this Article
will call for more realistic expectations of the process, the establishment
of conditions that make achievement of its potential more likely, and re-
forms to increase the inclusivity and safety of the process—thus fostering
all people’s ability to find and express their own voices, find and exercise
their abilities to consider the voice of the other, and arrive at their own
voluntary (self-determined) agreements.  There is work to be done.
II. MEDIATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION
The field of “alternative” dispute resolution is grounded in the concept
of self-determination.13 Oxford defines this concept as “[t]he process by
12. I am reminded of Professor Andrea Schneider’s recent remarks when accepting
the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution’s award for scholarship:
[W]hen I stepped back to think about what negotiation and ADR and inter-
national law and ethics all have in common, it is that they look for the best in
people. It is the ideal of how people and countries, should behave toward
one another with the recognition that ongoing interaction and communica-
tion inevitably includes conflict. It’s not that we can eliminate conflict–it’s
that we can handle it better. I also think that these classes are optimistic.
Why bother teaching them if you don’t believe that you can change the world
for the better? And I think that is something that most of us have in com-
mon–we are optimists. We do this work because we believe. We believe that
behavior can change, we believe that people can learn, we believe that most
leaders want what is best for their country and not just themselves. This opti-
mism has, of course, been labeled as naive over the years. It has been partic-
ularly tested this year. But, seriously, if we didn’t think that we could make a
difference, most of us would have found another career a long time ago!
This work also takes patience and persistence since we know people and situ-
ations do not change easily. So. . .for better or worse, I tend to view the
answer “no” as “not now.” And I will come back around to ask again. I also
think that when we view learning as an invitation—let’s do this together—we
are more likely to effectuate the change we want in our students, in our
schools, and in our communities. I think that what has worked for me is to
own this optimism and invite others along for the ride.
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Speech for the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Award for
Outstanding Scholarly Work (Apr. 22, 2017) (transcript available at http://www.indisputa-
bly.org/?p=10644 [https://perma.cc/E8WE-ZN6A]). See also Welsh, The Transitional State,
supra note 7, at 880 (observing that ADR proponents possess “a certain sort of faith,
grounded in the principle of self-determination [and] . . . believe in providing people with
the opportunity and tools to be their best, enabling them to take responsibility for making
serious decisions in a deliberative, thoughtful manner”).
13. Although arbitration advocates and mediation advocates sometimes are portrayed
as people with very different norms (see, e.g., S.I. Strong, Clash of Cultures: Epistemic
Communities, Negotiation Theory, and International Lawmaking, 50 AKRON L. REV. 495
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which a person controls their own life.”14 Merriam-Webster defines it as
“free choice of one’s own acts or states without external compulsion.”15
The Free Dictionary defines it as “[d]etermination of one’s own fate or
course of action without compulsion; free will.”16 All of these definitions
evince a faith in people’s desire and ability to control their own lives.17
For those of us who believe in the dignity and capacity of every human
being, there is some degree of magic in this concept of self-determination.
Importantly, self-determination is not familiar to most lawyers and
judges.18 Instead, it is a concept that finds its home in the worlds of diplo-
macy and nation building.19 Nonetheless, mediators in the United States
have long embraced self-determination. For example, the Model Stan-
dards of Conduct for Mediators adopted by the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) Section of Dispute Resolution, the American Arbitration
Association, and the Association for Conflict Resolution (formerly the
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution) in 1994 placed self-deter-
mination first among the standards. The 1994 Model Standards described
self-determination as “the fundamental principle of mediation.”20 Stan-
dard I of the 2005 Model Standards, meanwhile, provides: “A mediator
shall conduct a mediation based on the principle of party self-determina-
tion. Self-determination is the act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced
decision in which each party makes free and informed choices as to pro-
cess and outcome.”21 The vision of self-determination contained in this
standard is not quite as inspirational as those referenced earlier, but the
basic message remains the same: resolution of disputes in mediation shall
occur only if the people involved in the dispute choose resolution on their
own and without anyone forcing their hands.
(2016)), they/we share this commitment to providing people with the real opportunity to
resolve disputes in the manner that they choose. See Nancy A. Welsh, Introduction, 5 Y.B.
On Arb. & Mediation v (2013).
14. Self-determination, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://en.oxforddic
tionaries.com/definition/us/self-determination [https://perma.cc/4F6F-PEK3].
15. Self-determination, MERIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.mer-
riam-webster.com/dictionary/self-determination [https://perma.cc/L6WN-X68P].
16. Self-determination, THE FREE DICTIONARY (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DIC-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2016)), http://www.thefreedictionary.com/
self-determination [https://perma.cc/98GR-TFG9].
17. See Welsh, The Transitional State, supra note 7, at 878.
18. See Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note 4, at 60.
19. See Daniel Thürer & Thomas Burri, Self-Determination, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780
199231690/law-9780199231690-e873 [https://perma.cc/NX7F-4MZ9] (last updated Dec.
2008) (asserting that the origin of the modern concept of self-determination derives from
the U.S. Declaration of Independence, particularly the provision that governments “de-
rive[ ] ‘their just powers from the consent of the governed’ and that ‘whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it’”).
20. Am. Arb. Ass’n, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 17 J. NAT’L ASS’N OF
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 323, 324–25 (1997).
21. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard I (AM. ARB. ASS’N,
AM. BAR ASS’N DISPUTE RESOLUTION SECTION & ASS’N FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
2005).
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Largely due to concerns about declining access to justice—specifically,
concerns that litigants were experiencing unacceptable delay and in-
creased costs due to burgeoning civil and criminal court filings and litiga-
tion inefficiencies—federal and state courts institutionalized mediation
for the resolution of all sorts of civil matters. Respect for parties’ self-
determination was not a guiding principle. When insufficient numbers of
litigants voluntarily elected to try mediation to resolve their cases, courts
began making mediation mandatory. As lawyers became more involved
in the process, their voices and framing of issues dominated the discus-
sions occurring in mediation, thus marginalizing their clients’ participa-
tion. The lawyers also chose mediators who were experienced litigators or
judges with relevant subject-matter expertise. They sought mediators who
would provide reality testing.22 In some types of cases, lawyers counseled
their clients not to attend the mediation.23 Increasingly today, lawyers
urge mediators to avoid joint sessions that would allow the parties to talk
directly with each other. Instead, many lawyers prefer private conversa-
tions with the mediator (caucuses) and shuttle diplomacy.24
All of these adaptations have occurred while many courts continue to
describe mediation in a manner that hearkens back to the early days of
the contemporary mediation movement and as judges express a prefer-
ence for mediation because they believe that it involves the parties more
22. See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on
Looking: Lessons from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J.
399, 400, 420 (2005) [hereinafter McAdoo & Welsh, Look Before You Leap]; Riskin &
Welsh, Is That All There Is?, supra note 5, at 420; Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 5, at
846; Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note 4, at 8–9. I have even raised concerns that
lawyers are using mediation—specifically, the mediation privilege—to protect themselves
from potential malpractice suits arising out of the settlement of cases. See Nancy A. Welsh,
Musings on Mediation, Kleenex, and (Smudged) White Hats, 33 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 5, 13
(2011) [hereinafter Welsh, Musings on Mediation].
23. See TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS, DE-
FENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS AND GENDERED PARTIES 86–125 (2009).
24. See Lynne S. Bassis, Face-to-Face Sessions Fade Away: Why is Mediation’s Joint
Session Disappearing?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2014, at 33; Jay Folberg, The Shrinking
Joint Session: Survey Results, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2016, at 19; Eric Galton & Tracy
Allen, Don’t Torch the Joint Session, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2014, at 25–27; Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Insights on Mediator Practices and Perceptions, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter
2016, at 7. I pointed out the reduced use of joint session nearly twenty years ago. See
Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 5, at 789–91; Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note 4, at
20–21. Meanwhile, it is important to note that caucusing has been part of mediation for a
very long time. Researchers found that caucus was used in about two-thirds of the commu-
nity mediations studied; about 35% of disputants’ statements occurred in caucus as com-
pared to joint session; and
[i]n cases that employed a caucus, disputants used more persuasive argu-
ments, made fewer requests for reaction to an alternative, and generated
fewer new alternatives. Mediators employed more negative evaluations of
the parties’ behavior and less positive evaluations of their positions during
these cases. These findings suggest that mediators tend to call caucuses when
disputants are taking a contentious, as opposed to problem-solving,
approach.
Gary L. Welton et al., The Role of Caucusing in Community Mediation, 32 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 181, 199 (1988).
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directly in the resolution of their disputes.25 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, for example, defines media-
tion as
a process in which parties and counsel agree to meet with a neutral
mediator trained to assist them in settling disputes. The mediator im-
proves communication across party lines, helps parties articulate their
interests and understand those of the other party, probes the strengths
and weaknesses of each party’s legal positions, and identifies areas of
agreement and helps generate options for a mutually agreeable reso-
lution to the dispute. In all cases, mediation provides an opportunity
to explore a wide range of potential solutions and to address interests
that may be outside the scope of the stated controversy or which could
not be addressed by judicial action. A hallmark of mediation is its
capacity to expand traditional settlement discussions and broaden res-
olution options, often by exploring litigant needs and interests that
may be formally independent of the legal issues in controversy.26
When parties seek to set aside agreements they have reached in media-
tion, however, courts generally do not try to determine whether there was
“communication across party lines,” articulation and understanding of
the parties’ interests, “explor[ation of] a wide range of potential solu-
tions,” options that “address interests . . . outside the scope of the stated
controversy or which could not be addressed by judicial action,” and—
ultimately—the exercise of self-determination.27 Rather, courts look for
the other extreme, trying to determine whether any participant in the
process engaged in behaviors or threats so overwhelming that they could
be classified as “coercion.”28 Courts rarely find coercion in mediation.29
25. See Bobbi McAdoo, All Rise, The Court Is in Session: What Judges Say About
Court-Connected Mediation, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 377, 398–99 (2007) (reporting
that one of the top reasons that judges order parties into mediation is because they believe
it will get clients more directly involved in discussing their case and its resolution); McA-
doo & Welsh, Look Before You Leap, supra note 22, at 410; see also Jennifer W. Reynolds,
Judicial Reviews: What Judges Write When They Write About Mediation, 5 Y.B. ON ARB. &
MEDIATION 111, 142–143 (2013) (observing that when judges write about mediation, their
perspective and goals for the process depend upon whether they are focusing on their
obligation to process cases or serve as mediators themselves and care about the “fit” be-
tween the social role of the courts and mediation).
26. S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Local Civ. R. 83.8. (emphasis added). Interestingly, the defi-
nition of mediation on the court’s website varies slightly from the definition in its local
rules. There, mediation is defined as
a confidential process in which parties and counsel meet with a neutral third
party who is trained in settling disputes. The mediator assists in improving
communication across party lines, identifies areas of agreement, and helps
parties to generate a mutually agreeable resolution to the dispute. Mediation
provides an opportunity to explore a wide range of potential solutions and to
address interests that may be outside the scope of the stated controversy or
which could not be addressed by judicial action.
Mediation, E.D.N.Y., https://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/mediation [https://perma.cc/F4XB-
5HUZ].
27. S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Local Civ. R. 83.8.
28. See Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note 4, at 47.
29. See Nancy A. Welsh, Reconciling Self-Determination, Coercion, and Settlement in
Court-Connected Mediation, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECH-
NIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 420 (Jay Folberg, Ann L. Milne & Peter Salem eds., 2004);
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This standard of self-determination as “not coercion” represents a very
thin vision of self-determination indeed. But it is important to recall that
(1) the courts exist in order to produce resolution of disputes; (2) they do
not exist to foster citizens’ self-determination; (3) they have an interest in
the disposition of cases; and (4) they are constantly facing legislative calls
for increased efficiency, budget cuts, and competition from administrative
courts, private dispute resolution, and even international tribunals.30
Nonetheless, over the years, there has been no shortage of proposals to
reinvigorate self-determination in court-connected mediation.
Working under the assumption that courts will continue to mandate
parties’ participation in mediation, Leonard Riskin and I have urged that
courts should provide for a pre-mediation consultation with the parties to
determine the issues that the parties hope to address and their preferred
mediation model.31 Similarly assuming the continuation of mandatory
mediation, Jaqueline Nolan-Haley has called long and consistently for
parties to have access to information regarding their legal rights and rem-
edies so that their consent to any agreements in mediation is sufficiently
informed.32 Jennifer Reynolds has advocated for law schools to commit
themselves to educating members of the public regarding their legal
rights and the skills needed to participate in mediation.33 Stephen Lands-
man has proposed that state-appointed lawyers should accompany parties
Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note 4, at 47; see also 1 SARAH R. COLE ET AL., § 7:9.
Contract Defenses—Duress, in MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (Dec. 2016 Up-
date) (“Traditional duress principles would provide a pressured party no relief if the
‘threats’ come from the party’s lawyer and the mediator, and not from the adverse party.
Furthermore, if both the mediator and the lawyer believe the settlement is fair, the settle-
ment likely is within the range of settlements the courts would find acceptable.” (footnotes
omitted)).
30. See McAdoo & Welsh, Look Before You Leap, supra note 22, at 414–15; Nancy A.
Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Pro-
cedural Safeguards, 42 SW. L. REV. 187, 228 (2012) [hereinafter Welsh, Incentivizing Proce-
dural Safeguards]; Welsh, The Place of Mediation, supra note 7, at 140; Welsh, The
Transitional State, supra note 7, at 884–85; see also NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, Call to Action: Achieving Civil Justice for All: Recommendations to the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices by the Civil Justice Improvements Committee (2016); NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, Civil Justice Initiative: The Landscape of Civil Litigation in
State Courts (2016); Corina D. Gerety & Brittany K.T. Kauffman, Summary of Empirical
Research on the Civil Justice Process: 2008-2013 (2014).
31. See Riskin & Welsh, Is That All There Is?, supra note 5, at 920–21. As noted in the
article, staff mediators at the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and
the Ninth Circuit provide such consultations.
32. See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle
for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 799–823 (1998); see
also McAdoo & Welsh, Look Before You Leap, supra note 22, at 413–15 (regarding con-
cerns about ordering self-represented litigants into mediation); Welsh, The Thinning Vi-
sion, supra note 4, at 5 (describing one vision of self-determination that focuses on
ensuring parties have relevant information about rights, remedies, and usual settlements).
33. See Jennifer W. Reynolds, Luck v. Justice: Consent Intervenes, but for Whom?, 14
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 245, 306–07 (2014) [hereinafter Reynolds, Luck] (examining the
meaning of consent and calling for law schools to engage in public education regarding the
law relevant to landlord-tenant, income tax, family, immigration, Social Security, and
workers compensation and to improve people’s skills in negotiation, mediation, and con-
tract-reading; also providing examples of law schools that offer “people’s law schools” and
clinics that conduct outreach as well provide direct client service).
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in mediation,34 while Kristen Blankley has urged that lawyers should use
limited scope agreements to provide legal representation to clients in me-
diation.35 Omer Shapira has focused on mediators’ ethics, calling for revi-
sion of the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators to require
mediators to foster parties’ real, substantive self-determination rather
than permitting formal, illusory self-determination to suffice.36 Alone and
34. See Stephan Landsman, Nothing for Something? Denying Legal Assistance to
Those Compelled to Participate in ADR Proceedings, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273, 277
(2010); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyerless Dispute Resolution: Rethinking a Paradigm,
37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 381, 416–17 (2010) (reporting on one legal services office that
largely limits its lawyers’ time to representation of clients on the day of mediation, with
strikingly good results).
35. See Kristen M. Blankley, Adding by Subtracting: How Limited Scope Agreements
for Dispute Resolution Representation Can Increase Access to Attorney Services, 28 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 659, 661–62 (2013). Interestingly, Dr. Roselle Wissler has observed
that people participate less and express less satisfaction with their participation when rep-
resented by lawyers in mediation. She also provides several possible reasons for this. Ro-
selle L. Wissler, Representation in Mediation: What We Know from Empirical Research, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419, 446–47 (2010).
36. See Omer Shapira, A Critical Assessment of the Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators (2005): Call for Reform, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 81, 125–27 (2016). Omer Shapira
has recently examined the concept of self-determination in some detail:
[T]he exercise of self-determination requires the convergence of three accu-
mulative elements: competency to make decisions, voluntariness and lack of
coercion at the time of decision-making, and the availability and understand-
ing of the information relevant to the decision-making. It will be helpful in
the following discussion to distinguish between the factual observation that
an autonomous decision has been made, and its value or quality. An autono-
mous decision must satisfy the first two conditions of self-determination: it
must be made with competence, and be voluntary and uncoerced. An auton-
omous decision need not satisfy the third condition of self-determination,
and could be based on inadequate information. However, such a decision
would be of low quality. To put it differently, an uninformed decision is an
exercise of formal self-determination, while a decision made with awareness
of information relevant to the decision is an exercise of substantive self-
determination.
. . . The more the elements of self-determination are present and realized, the
more likely it is that the decision is the product of substantive rather than
formal self-determination. The exact point that separates substantive self-de-
termination from formal self-determination might sometimes be blurred.
However, it seems to me that the legitimate expectation of mediation parties
is for “true,” i.e., substantive, self-determination, not formal self-determina-
tion. This expectation of a real, substantive exercise of rights is sometimes
described as an expectation of fairness or justice.
. . . .
. . . for a decision to be the product of “real,” substantive self-determination,
as opposed to illusory, formal self-determination, each of the elements of
self-determination must be of high quality: a high degree of competence in
the sense of a high capacity to perceive and process information, as opposed
to a low degree of competence following, for example, mental stress, confu-
sion, or exhaustion; a high degree of voluntariness in the sense of a decision-
making process free of coercive attempts, as opposed to a low degree of vol-
untariness following coercive acts and pressures that leave the decision-
maker with feelings of helplessness and lack of choice; and decisions that are
based on information relevant to the decision and understood by the deci-
sion-maker, as opposed to decisions that are based on inadequate informa-
tion or on a misunderstanding of the information and its implications. When
one or more of the elements of self-determination are of low quality, we will
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with others, I have urged courts to establish mechanisms to monitor me-
diation or provide parties with post-mediation opportunities to submit
feedback regarding their experience with the mediation process and the
mediators.37 I have also advocated for a “cooling off” period to be ap-
plied to mediated settlement agreements, which would allow parties to
rescind their agreements at will as long as such rescission occurred rela-
tively promptly after the agreement was reached.38 I have urged that
courts should be sure that court-connected mediation is supplemented
with other alternatives so that parties are ordered to participate in the
process that is most appropriate for their dispute—rather than expecting
mediation to be all things to all people.39
Of course, other means to protect and foster parties’ self-determination
would be to end courts’ mandatory imposition of mediation, make use of
mediation only presumptive, or mandate something less than mediation.
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley has urged very recently that courts should never
consider the decision-making process as reflecting the exercise of formal self-
determination, and tend to treat it as unfair or unjust.
OMER SHAPIRA, A THEORY OF MEDIATORS’ ETHICS: FOUNDATIONS, RATIONALE, AND
APPLICATION 137–38, 141–42 (2016).
37. See Welsh, The Place of Mediation, supra note 75, at 139-140; see also Bobbi McA-
doo & Nancy Welsh, Court-Connected General Civil ADR Programs: Aiming for Institu-
tionalization, Efficient Resolution, and the Experience of Justice, in ADR HANDBOOK FOR
JUDGES (Donna Stienstra & Susan M. Yates eds., 2004) [hereinafter McAdoo & Welsh,
Aiming for Insitutionalization]; McAdoo & Welsh, Look Before You Leap, supra note 22,
at 427, 430; Nancy A. Welsh, Magistrate Judges, Settlement, and Procedural Justice, 16 NEV.
L.J. 983, 990 (2016) [hereinafter Welsh, Magistrate Judges] (description of survey and at-
tachment); Nancy A. Welsh, Donna Stienstra & Bobbi McAdoo, The Application of Proce-
dural Justice Research to Judicial Actions and Techniques in Settlement Sessions, in THE
MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Tania Sourdin &
Archie Zariski eds., 2013); Nancy A. Welsh & Bobbi McAdoo, Eyes on the Prize: The
Struggle for Professionalism, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2005, at 15 [hereinafter Welsh &
McAdoo, Eyes on the Prize]. The ABA Dispute Resolution Section’s Certification Task
Force addressed credentialing organizations’ responsibility in this area, concluding that
they should “[p]rovide an accessible, transparent system to register complaints against
credentialed mediators.” ALT. DISP. RESOL. SEC. OF THE AM. BAR ASSOC. TASK FORCE
ON MEDIATOR CREDENTIALING, FINAL REPORT 4 (2012) [hereineafter Mediation Re-
search Task Force Report]. The Task Force also noted that “[a] majority of the Task Force
believes organizations should have a process to monitor the performance of credentialed
mediators, such as periodic requests for feedback [while a] minority believes such monitor-
ing is not feasible.” Id.
38. See Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note 4, at 87–89. This approach has been
adopted by Minnesota for debtor-creditor matters, Florida in family matters, and Califor-
nia in insurance matters. See Minn. State 572.35(2) (providing for 72 hours to rescind me-
diated settlement agreement between debtor and creditor); Fla. Family L. R. P. 12.74(f)(1)
(providing for ten-day cooling-off period for agreements reached in family mediation, if
attorneys do not accompany parties); Cal. Ins. Code 10089.82(c) (providing a three-day
cooling-off period for insured to rescind mediated agreement reached regarding earth-
quake insurance dispute, provided that insured was not accompanied by counsel at the
mediation and the settlement agreement is not signed by her counsel). See also Reynolds,
Luck, supra note 33, at 309 (expressing great skepticism regarding the likelihood that par-
ties will exercise such opt-out rights).
39. See Nancy A. Welsh, You’ve Got Your Mother’s Laugh: What Bankruptcy Media-
tion Can Learn from the Her/History of Divorce and Child Custody Mediation, 17 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427, 455–56 (2009).
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be permitted to make mediation mandatory in the first place.40 Bobbi
McAdoo and I have urged, separately and together, that if courts make
mediation mandatory it should be for only a short time—perhaps two
years so that lawyers have enough time to experience it—and then its use
should be made voluntary.41 Bobbi McAdoo and I have also advocated
for allowing parties to opt out of mandatory mediation at will, without
any required showing whatsoever.42 Some courts specifically provide for
such opt-outs.43 Often, however, such permission is conditioned upon a
sufficient showing by at least one of the parties or a screening by the
mediator.44 Andrea Schneider and I have endorsed proposals to mandate
only the parties’ participation in pre-mediation meetings to educate the
parties regarding the mediation process.45 Jacqueline Nolan-Haley has
suggested that courts could create incentives to encourage parties’ partici-
pation in mediation—i.e., in cases involving fee-shifting provisions, courts
could determine whether a party’s refusal to voluntarily participate in
mediation should be punished by refusing to shift all or a portion of the
fees that they would otherwise be entitled to receive.46
Most of these proposals have fallen on barren soil in American courts
and thus have borne no or little fruit. The only real exception is the op-
tion of allowing parties to opt out, usually conditioned upon a sufficient
showing. This exception exists primarily in court-connected family media-
40. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Judicial Review of Mediated Settlement Agree-
ments: Improving Mediation with Consent, 5 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 152, 158 (2013).
41. See McAdoo & Welsh, Look Before You Leap, supra note 22, at 413; Welsh, The
Place of Mediation, supra note 7, at 137–39; see also Frank E. A. Sander, Another View of
Mandatory Mediation, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2007 at 16 (describing mandatory medi-
ation as “a kind of temporary expedient, a la affirmative action”).
42. See McAdoo & Welsh, Look Before You Leap, supra note 22, at 427; Welsh, The
Place of Mediation, supra note 7, at 130–32.
43. See, e.g., Donna Shestowsky, The Psychology of Procedural Preference: How Liti-
gants Evaluate Legal Procedures Ex Ante, 99 IOWA L. REV. 637, 695–96 (2014).
44. See McAdoo & Welsh, Aiming for Institutionalization, supra note 37; McAdoo &
Welsh, Look Before You Leap, supra note 22, at 414; Welsh, The Place of Mediation, supra
note 7, at 131–32; see also Robin H. Ballard et al., Detecting Intimate Partner Violence in
Family and Divorce Mediation: A Randomized Trial of Intimate Partner Violence Screen-
ing, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 241, 242 (2011) [hereinafter Ballard]; Viktoria Pokman
et al., Mediator’s Assessment of Safety Issues and Concerns (MASIC): Reliability and Valid-
ity of a New Intimate Partner Violence Screen, 21 ASSESSMENT 529 (2014) [hereinafter
Pokman]; Kelly Browe Olson, Screening for Intimate Partner Violence in Mediation, DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Fall 2013, at 25 [hereinafter Olson].
45. See Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of
Mediation into Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71,
134–35 (2013). I (alone, with Andrea Schneider, and with Bobbi McAdoo) have also ex-
amined even less intrusive mandatory options—e.g., mandating that lawyers inform their
clients about mediation or mandating that lawyers consult with their clients about ADR
and then advise the court regarding their parties’ preferences). See Nancy A. Welsh &
Andrea K. Schneider, Becoming “Investor-State Mediation”, 1 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF.
86, 92–93 (2012); Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note 4, at 81–82; McAdoo & Welsh,
Aiming for Institutionalization, supra note 37, at 17;  Nancy A. Welsh & Bobbi McAdoo,
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Minnesota—An Update on Rule 114, in COURT-
ANNEXED MEDIATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SELECTED STATE AND FEDERAL PRO-
GRAMS 203, 206–207 (Edward Bergman and John Bickerman, eds., 1998).
46. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Is Europe Headed Down the Primrose Path with
Mandatory Mediation?, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 981, 1005–06 (2012).
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tion and represents an acknowledgement of the unfortunately widespread
reality and likely effects of intimate partner abuse.47
At this point, then, it is difficult to muster up faith in the reality of the
magic of self-determination as applied to court-connected mediation, es-
pecially mandatory court-connected mediation. The courts, certainly, are
not going to act as the optimizers or guarantors of self-determination.
As a result, this Article will now turn from the concept of self-determi-
nation to the social–psychological concept of procedural justice. This is
because assuring procedural justice in mediation may serve as a reasona-
ble link between achieving the courts’ mission of case disposition and
providing a meaningful measure of self-determination in mediation.
III. MEDIATION AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:
THE USUAL STORY
Many people use the social–psychological term “procedural justice,”
but a smaller number actually ground their understanding in the vast so-
cial–psychological empirical literature regarding the subject.48 This litera-
ture reveals that people tend to perceive a process as fair or just if it
includes the following elements: (1) “voice” or the opportunity for people
to express what is important to them;49 (2) “trustworthy consideration”
or a demonstration that encourages people to believe that their voice was
heard by the decision-maker or authority figure;50 (3) a neutral forum
47. See, e.g., Ballard, supra note 44, at 241–243, 253; Pokman, supra note 44, at 529–31;
Olson, supra note 44. It is relatively easy to comprehend why an abused intimate partner
would not feel the presence of self-determination in a mediation if he or she has been
harmed by an abusing partner and fears being harmed again. Others have suggested—
legitimately—that an individual who has suffered harassment, discrimination, retaliation,
or has been the victim of abuse or a hate crime could feel quite similarly in mediation.
However, the courts generally have not established opt outs for these types of cases.
48. Meanwhile, there is also a vast empirical literature regarding related concepts—
organizational justice, interactional justice, informational justice, etc. See Lisa Blomgren
Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for Managing Conflict, 24
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 26-46 (2008) (cataloguing the many different categories of
justice that have been identified); Lisa Blomgren Amsler et al., Dispute Systems Design:
Preventing, Managing and Resolving Conflict (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
49. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDU-
RAL JUSTICE 211–12 (1988) [hereinafter LIND & TYLER, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY]; E. Allan
Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, in EVERYDAY
PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 177, 187 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Lind,
Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions]; Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and
Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 121 (2000) [hereinafter Tyler, Social Justice] (describ-
ing voice as the opportunity for people to present their “suggestions” or “arguments about
what should be done to resolve a problem or conflict” or “sharing the discussion over the
issues involved in their problem or conflict” and also noting that voice effects have been
found even when people know they will have little or no influence on decision makers);
Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A
Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 488–89 (2010) (reporting that voice
“shapes evaluations about neutrality, trust, and respect” and has the “strongest influence,
followed respectively by neutrality, trust, and respect”).
50. Theories regarding “social exchange,” heuristics, and “group value” explain the
importance of this perception. In part, at least, people care about voice—and trustworthy
consideration—because they wish to know that the decision-maker is fully informed re-
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that applies the same objective standards to all and treats the parties in an
even-handed manner;51 and (4) treatment that is dignified.52 If people
believe that they were treated fairly in a decision-making or dispute reso-
lution procedure (i.e., the process was “procedurally just” or “procedur-
ally fair”), they are more likely to (1) perceive that the substantive
outcome is fair—even when it is adverse to them;53 (2) comply with the
outcome;54 and (3) perceive that the sponsoring institution is legitimate.55
garding their perspective, in hopes that this will influence the outcome. See Lind, Procedu-
ral Justice, Disputing, and Reactions, supra note 49, at 179. But people care about
procedural fairness even when they have been told their voice will not influence the out-
come. Procedural justice researchers now theorize that procedural fairness serves as a fair-
ness “heuristic.” See E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution:
Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 225–26 (1993);
Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedu-
ral Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 185–86 (2005); Kees van den Bos et al., How
Do I Judge My Outcome When I Do Not Know the Outcome of Others? The Psychology of
the Fair Process Effect, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1034, 1034–36 (1997). Ac-
cording to the “group value” or “relational” theory, meanwhile, people also care about the
opportunity for voice and sincere consideration because these procedural elements signal
the individual’s value and social standing within the relevant social group. See Donald E.
Conlon et al., Nonlinear and Nonmonotonic Effects of Outcome on Procedural and Distrib-
utive Fairness Judgments, 19 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1085, 1095 (1989); Tom R. Tyler,
Psychological Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive and Procedural Jus-
tice, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 850, 858 (1994) [hereinafter Tyler, Psychological
Models].
51. See Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings
of Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 664 (2007)
[hereinafter Tyler, American Public] (“Transparency and openness foster the belief that
decisionmaking procedures are neutral.”); see also Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A
Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process,
29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747, 749 (2003) (distinguishing between “for-
mal” or “structural” aspects of groups that influence perceptions of process fairness, such
as group rules, and the “informal” influences that result from individual authority’s actual
implementation of the rules).
52. See E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of
Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953, 958 (1990); Tyler,
Social Justice, supra note 49, at 122; Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A
Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830, 831 (1989).
While dignified or respectful treatment is described here as an essential element of proce-
dural justice, it has also been described as an element of interactional justice, and even of
distributive justice. See Robert J. Bies, Are Procedural Justice and Interactional Justice
Conceptually Distinct?, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 85, 85–86 (Jerald
Greenberg & Jason A. Colquitt eds., 2005).
53. See Lind & Tyler, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 49, at 66–70; Tyler, Social Jus-
tice, supra note 49, at 119.
54. See Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions, supra note 49, at 192; Tyler,
American Public, supra note 51, at 673–74 (describing procedural justice findings generally
and research that has identified procedural justice and trust as the key antecedents of the
willingness to defer to legal authorities); Tyler, Psychological Models, supra note 50, at 857;
Tyler, Social Justice, supra note 49, at 119.
55. See Lind & Tyler, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 49 at 209; Lind, Procedural
Justice, Disputing, and Reactions, supra note 49, at 188. This perception is obviously impor-
tant to courts. See DAVID B. ROTTMAN, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS: A SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC AND ATTORNEYS 24
(2005); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 94–108 (1990); Tyler, American Pub-
lic, supra note 51, at 665; Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social
Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 885–86 (1997)
(suggesting that the influence of procedural justice judgments supports the idea “that the
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This is the usual story, the generally true story. It is not the whole story,
but the Article will return to that a bit later.
For now, it is important to notice the potential relationship between a
procedurally just process and one that provides some measure of self-
determination. If a person truly has and takes advantage of the opportu-
nity for voice56—i.e., if she truly says what she wants and needs to say—
she has engaged in an act of procedural self-determination. Her expres-
sion of voice also makes it more likely that she will have significant input
into the outcome (even though she cannot entirely control that out-
public has a very moral orientation toward the courts” and “[t]hey expect the courts to
conform to their moral values,” especially regarding “the fairness of the procedures by
which the courts make decisions”).
56. I need to distinguish here between voice and participation. They are related but
not the same. Dr. Roselle Wissler has conducted research indicating that people’s percep-
tions of procedural justice in mediation are strongly influenced by their perception that
they had voice—i.e., the opportunity to tell their views of the dispute. See Wissler, Repre-
sentation in Mediation, supra note 35, at 448 n.136, 450. Interestingly, the relationship be-
tween perceptions of procedural justice and voice is much stronger than the relationship
between perceptions of procedural justice and the amount of time people spent talking
during (i.e., participating directly in) the mediation. See id. at 452 (“Parties’ sense that they
had a chance to tell their views was more strongly related to favorable assessments of
mediation than was how much they participated. Thus, ensuring that parties feel they have
a chance to fully express their views appears to be more important to their experience in
mediation than how much they participate directly.”). Indeed, although there is a relation-
ship between people’s perception of voice and the amount of time they talked in the medi-
ation, many people felt they had voice even when they spoke very little or not at all. See id.
at 448–49, 451 (“Thus, although talking a lot virtually guaranteed that parties felt they had
voice, not talking at all, or having a lawyer who talked a great deal, did not prevent a
substantial number of parties from feeling they had a chance to tell their views. These
findings suggest that parties can feel they have voice through their lawyers. It is not clear,
however, why some parties who did not talk in mediation felt they had voice while others
did not; perhaps it made a difference whether parties preferred not to talk and wanted
their lawyer to speak for them, or whether they were ‘shut down’ by their lawyers, the
mediator, or the other side.” Rather, people can feel they had voice even if they spent little
time talking in mediation or if their lawyer dominated the conversation.). Consistent with
some of the original procedural justice research conducted by Walker, Thibaut, and others,
it appears that many people perceived they had voice as a result of their lawyers’ participa-
tion. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 5, at 841–43 (describing early studies by Walker,
Thibaut, LaTour, and Lind).
It also appears that those who felt they had voice but did not talk a lot were less likely to
feel pressured to settle. In contrast, those who spoke more in both domestic relations and
civil mediation sessions were more likely to feel pressured to settle. See Wissler, Represen-
tation in Mediation, supra note 35, at 449–50; see also Roselle L. Wissler, An Evaluation of
the Common Pleas Court Civil Pilot Mediation Project viii (Feb. 2000) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author). Meanwhile, “parties who said their lawyer talked more felt
less pressured to settle than did parties who said their lawyer talked less.” Wissler, Repre-
sentation in Mediation, supra note 35, at 451.
Wissler’s research suggests, to me at least, that the opportunity for voice is not the same
thing as the opportunity to engage in the give-and-take of negotiation. See Welsh, Stepping
Back Through the Looking Glass, supra note 7, at 654–58 (observing that while parents in
special education mediation sessions valued the opportunity for voice, they did not particu-
larly value the opportunity to negotiate or problem-solve with school officials). Further,
Wissler’s findings appear consistent with other research suggesting that people value hav-
ing their lawyers serve as “buffers” who reduce the need to engage directly in unpleasant
interpersonal conflict. See Stephen LaTour et al., Procedure: Transnational Perspectives
and Preferences, 86 YALE L.J. 258, 274 (1976).
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come),57 and the opportunity to share this information may open up a
new path toward both relational and instrumental resolution. It is impor-
tant to notice as well the ways in which trustworthy consideration, a neu-
tral forum, and even-handed and dignified treatment may create a greater
likelihood that both parties will be able to hear and share information
that may surprise or enlighten them, that such information may create
new opportunities for resolution, that the parties may experience en-
hanced trust, and that this trust and the expanded exchange of informa-
tion thus may produce both an integrative solution and a changed
relationship.58
All of this potential is entirely consistent with the tantalizing promise
of substantive self-determination. Long ago, Isabelle Gunning highlighted
such potential and its particular promise for otherwise-disadvantaged
people who need the opportunity to express “their authentic voices and
experiences.”59 Mediation seemed to offer such people a forum in which
“ideas about equality are [or at least could be] defined and redefined.”60
Thus, a procedurally just mediation process had the potential to bring
different people together in a safe space,61 break through preexisting ste-
reotypes and behaviors that continue to mar negotiations,62 and model
57. See Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants’ Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation:
A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 187 (2002) [here-
inafter Welsh, Hollow Promise].
58. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Reputational Advantages of Demonstrating Trustworthi-
ness: Using the Reputation Index with Law Students, 28 NEGOT. J. 117, 133–34, 136 (2012)
(observing the correlations that have been found among behaviors associated with proce-
dural justice perceptions, enhanced perceptions of trustworthiness, enhanced information
sharing, and enhanced likelihood of capturing available integrative potential) (citing Mor-
ton Deutsch, Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, 4 POL. PSYCHOL. 431, 438 (1983);
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381 (2010)).
59. Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural
Myths, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 55, 67 (1995).
60. Id. at 67, 86.
61. This is consistent with one of the interventions recommended to combat implicit
bias. See Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision
Making: How It Affects Judgment and What Judges Can Do About It, in ENHANCING JUS-
TICE: REDUCING BIAS 87 (Sarah Redfield ed., 2017) (describing exposure to stereotype-
incongruent models as one means to combat implicit bias directly).
62. There are many examples of empirical research that demonstrate racial discrimina-
tion in the selection of potential negotiation partners and the negotiation process itself.
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for
a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304 (1995) (experiment involving more than 400 visits to
200 car dealerships in Chicago); Ian Ayres et al., Race Effects on eBay, 46 RAND J. ECON.
891 (2015) (experiment involving sale of baseball cards in eBay auction held by light-
skinned versus dark-skinned hand with payment of 20% less if card was held by a dark-
skinned hand—even though that card was actually more valuable); Benjamin Edelman,
Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence
from a Field Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J. 1 (2017) (rental of home to “guests”—8% more
likely to accept queries from Caucasian-seeming names than African-American-seeming
names; the exception was that African-American females did not discriminate against Afri-
can-American females, but both Caucuasians and African-Americans discriminated
against African-Americans generally); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are
Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004) (resumes for those with white-
sounding names 50% more likely to get callbacks than those with African-American-
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the respect, responsibility, and dialogue that “fair and equal” people
could and should extend to each other.63 However, as this Article has
already indicated, there is a “rest” of the procedural justice story. The
Article turns to this now.
IV. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE MEETS INEQUALITY
A. THE POTENTIAL FOR “SHAM” PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
First, and unfortunately, something called “sham” procedural justice
exists. A process may include all of the elements listed above—with the
implicit message that people’s voice has the potential to affect the out-
come. However, the mediator or the parties may have absolutely no in-
tention of allowing themselves to be affected by what they have heard or
seen. This situation is most likely to occur when the mediator or the other
party has a vested interest in the outcome.64 Under these circumstances,
the mediator or the other party may be using the lessons of procedural
justice research simply to seduce compliance.65 Not surprisingly, people’s
trust can plummet if they learn that they were misled and unwittingly
sounding names); Marc-David L. Seidel, Jeffrey T. Polzer & Katherine J. Steward, Friends
in High Places: The Effects of Social Networks on Discrimination in Salary Negotiations, 45
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (2000) (members of racial minority groups negotiated significantly lower
salary increases from hiring managers’ initial offers); see also MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN
E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT (2011).
63. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Let’s Put Ourselves Out of Business: On Respect, Respon-
sibility, and Dialogue in Dispute Resolution, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 227, 230 (2003); see also
Nancy A. Welsh, I Could Have Been a Contender: Summary Jury Trial as a Means to Over-
come Iqbal’s Negative Effects upon Pre-Litigation Communication, Negotiation and Early,
Consensual Dispute Resolution, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2010) [hereinafter
Welsh, I Could Have Been a Contender] (arguing that people have to be motivated to have
this kind of conversation; that fear of litigation, discovery, and trial may provide such moti-
vation to otherwise-dominant players; and that trial procedures aspire to model a fair and
equal dialogue that overcomes the preexisting power relations between the litigating
parties).
64. See LIND & TYLER, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 49, at 179–84.
65. See Eric Miller, Thanks for Inviting Me, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 8, 2017, 3:25 PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/09/thanks-for-inviting-me.html [https://per
ma.cc/486V-4ZJZ] (describing the “sociological theory [of procedural justice as] . . . not a
theory of justice, but of what makes for effective psychological coercion” and observing in
the context of police-citizenry interactions that”[i]f we give the police credit for engaging in
non-violent psychological coercion of the folks they encounter, are we giv[ing] them—and
ourselves—too much credit for promoting ‘just’ policing[?]”); see also Avram Bornstein et
al., Tell It to the Judge: Procedural Justice and a Community Court in Brooklyn, 39 POLAR
206 (2016) (citing to MacCoun and describing potential for procedural justice to produce
“false consciousness”; also describing behavior of judge and problem-solving court in Red
Hook court—demonstrating respect, compassion, interest in person, helpfulness, ability to
access resources—and describing such behavior as fairer than what is provided by other
courts); Keith G. Allred, Relationship Dynamics in Disputes: Replacing Contention with
Cooperation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 83, 92–93 (Michael L. Moffitt
& Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (noting the paucity of empirical data but observing that
his “experience as a mediator suggests that manipulative uses of procedural justice are on
the rise in both the public and private sectors” as well as overly simplistic application of
procedural justice principles; specifically citing examples involving a Fortune 500 aerospace
company and the Forest Service).
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participated in a sham procedure.66 They may perceive the outcome of
this sham procedure to be less fair than the identical outcome of an obvi-
ously unfair process.67
Importantly, however, this “frustration effect” has been found to occur
quite rarely—e.g., when the apparent procedural justice of a process is
relatively weak, the evidence of bias is strong, or a colleague points out
the inequity of the outcome. E. Allan Lind and Tom Tyler have con-
cluded that frustration effects “will occur only when there is overwhelm-
ing social or factual support for the supposition that the procedure is
corrupt.”68 The marginalized and vulnerable are most likely to bear the
brunt of a sham procedure—and recent decades have seen worrisome
growth in the gap between “haves” and “have-nots” around the world.69
Unfortunately, the marginalized and vulnerable also may be least likely
to detect that they were the victims of a sham procedure.70
B. STATUS AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE PERCEPTIONS AND INFLUENCE
OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
There is also research indicating that even if a process is authentic and
conducted in a procedurally just manner, individuals’ roles or social sta-
tuses affect the extent to which their judgments regarding procedural jus-
tice will influence their perceptions of substantive justice. Some of this
research involves mediation directly. The Metrocourt Project, for exam-
ple, reported that Hispanic-American litigants were more likely than
Whites to be satisfied with the mediation process and its outcomes, even
though Hispanic-Americans’ mediation outcomes were neither as
favorable as Whites’ mediation outcomes nor as favorable as the out-
66. People are aware of their vulnerability to manipulation and if they perceive evi-
dence of unfair treatment or perceive “false representations of fair treatment,” they re-
spond with “extremely negative reactions.” Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and
Reactions, supra note 49, at 187; see Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction
with Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 72, 73–74 (1985) (explaining that, under certain conditions, voice without deci-
sion control heightens feelings of procedural injustice and dissatisfaction with leaders, a
result described as the “‘frustration’ effect”). Note that what seems to matter here is the
falsity of the explicit or implicit representation that people’s voice will have the potential to
influence the outcome. In somewhat surprising contrast, there is substantial research dem-
onstrating that if people are told in advance that their voice will not or cannot influence the
outcome, they are nonetheless more likely to judge a process as procedurally just if the
process includes an opportunity for voice. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 5, at
821–22 (describing these studies).
67. See LIND & TYLER, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 49, at 180.
68. Id. at 183–84.  Recent research has found an interesting and very strong relation-
ship between people’s perceptions of the existence of the rule of law and the absence of
corruption. See Mila Versteeg & Tom Ginsburg, Measuring the Rule of Law: A Compari-
son of Indicators, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 100, 117-118 (2017) (discussing the overwhelm-
ing correlation between Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and
the Rule of Law indicators of the Heritage Foundation, World Bank, World Justice Project
and Freedom House).
69. See Ellen Waldman & Lola Akin Ojelabi, Mediators and Substantive Justice: A
View from Rawls’ Original Position, 30 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 391, 398–400 (2016);
Reynolds, Luck, supra note 33.
70. See Reynolds, Luck, supra note 33.
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comes Hispanic-Americans received in adjudication.71 Interestingly, wo-
men of color expressed the highest level of satisfaction with mediation,
while white women were the least satisfied and least likely to perceive the
mediation process as fair even though they experienced the most
favorable outcomes.72
Recent research in the Netherlands regarding the mediation of labor
disputes similarly indicates that people’s place in a hierarchy affects the
influence of their procedural justice perceptions upon their perceptions of
substantive outcomes. In this study, researchers found that supervisors
were more likely than subordinates to judge mediation as effective even
when the supervisors perceived low levels of procedural justice. Mean-
while, subordinates’ perceptions of mediation’s procedural justice deter-
mined their perceptions of the process’s effectiveness. Especially if
subordinates perceived low levels of procedural justice, they perceived
mediation to be ineffective.73 Supervisors also were more likely than sub-
ordinates to perceive mediation as procedurally just. Thus, in this re-
search, those with higher status in the hierarchy of the workplace were
more likely than those lower in the hierarchy to judge mediation as pro-
cedurally just and effective and less likely to find that low levels of proce-
dural justice undermined the effectiveness of the mediation process.
Other research, not involving mediation, also suggests the relevance of
status to procedural justice perceptions and their power.74 Substantial re-
search has been conducted regarding the effect of procedural justice per-
71. See Michele Hermann, New Mexico Research Examines Impact of Gender and
Ethnicity in Mediation, in THE CONFLICT AND CULTURE READER 91, 91–92 (Pat K. Chew
ed., 2001) [hereinafter Hermann, New Mexico Research]; MICHELE HERMANN ET AL., THE
METROCOURT PROJECT FINAL REPORT: A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF ETHNICITY AND
GENDER IN MEDIATED AND ADJUDICATED SMALL CLAIM CASES AT THE METROPOLITAN
COURT MEDIATION CENTER, BERNALILLO COUNTY, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO:
CASES MEDIATED OR ADJUDICATED SEPTEMEBER 1990-OCTOBER 1991 viii-xvii (1993)
[hereinafter HERMANN, METROCOURT].
72. See Hermann, New Mexico Research, supra note 71, at 92.
73. Katalien Bollen, Heidi Ittner & Martin C. Euwema, Mediating Hierarchical Labor
Conflicts: Procedural Justice Makes a Difference—for Subordinates, 21 GROUP DECISION &
NEGOT. 621, 621–36 (2012).  It appears that the researchers defined “effectiveness” largely
in terms of settlement.  See Roberto Martinez-Pecino, Lourdes Munduate, Francisco J.
Medina & Martin C. Euwema, Effectiveness of Mediation Strategies in Collective Bargain-
ing, 47 IND. RELATIONS 480, 481 (2008) (pointing to a 30% difference in total settlements
achieved as evidence that mediation interventions are more effective in interest conflicts
than in rights conflicts).
74. See Welsh, I Could Have Been a Contender, supra note 63, at 1169–70 (citing Jody
Clay-Warner, Perceiving Procedural Injustice: The Effects of Group Membership and Sta-
tus, 64 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 224, 232–33 (2001); Kristina A. Diekmann et al., Does Fairness
Matter More to Some Than to Others? The Moderating Role of Workplace Status on the
Relationship Between Procedural Fairness Perceptions and Job Satisfaction, 20 SOC. JUST.
RES. 161, 163 (2007); Jan-Willem Van Prooijen et al., Procedural Justice and Intragroup
Status: Knowing Where We Stand in a Group Enhances Reactions to Procedures, 41 J. EX-
PERIMENTAL SOC. PSCYHOL. 644, 645 (2005); Jan-Willem Van Prooijen et al., Procedural
Justice and Status: Status Salience as Antecedent of Procedural Fairness Effects, 83 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1353, 1359 (2002)); see also Eric J. Miller, Encountering Resis-
tance: Contesting Policing and Procedural Justice, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295 (arguing that
procedural justice is dangerous, a psychological ploy to get people to comply and cooper-
ate and reveal information that may land them in a criminal proceeding; “voice” should
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ceptions on people’s perceptions of substantive justice when they interact
with police. In general, that research has shown that when police behave
in a manner consistent with procedural justice, people are more likely to
perceive substantive outcomes as fair even when they are adverse. In
other words, the provision of procedural justice can reduce the impact of
outcome favorability on perceptions of substantive fairness.75 Other re-
search has shown, meanwhile, that in making judgments about procedural
fairness, people of color “place[d] significantly greater weight on evi-
dence about their social standing than did White group members.”76 The
researchers measured social standing by asking respondents “whether the
authorities had been polite to them”and “had shown respect for their [re-
spondents’] rights.”77
More recent research suggests that in interactions between lower status
and higher status people in negotiations or the workplace, the lower sta-
tus persons are more likely to desire future interactions with higher status
persons if they perceive that the higher status persons behaved in a pro-
cedurally just manner—even when those interactions produced disap-
pointing outcomes for the lower status persons. In contrast, the higher
status persons (which would tend to include more powerful parties and
dominant repeat players) were less likely to be influenced by procedural
fairness. Indeed, when lower status persons treated them in a procedur-
ally just manner, those with higher status were more likely to perceive
outcomes as fair only if those outcomes were consistent with what they
expected or knew themselves to be entitled to receive.78
These findings regarding the interaction between status and the compo-
sition and influence of procedural justice perceptions may be explained
by the notion that procedural justice is more important and more influen-
tial for those who are lower status. Many studies have shown that peo-
ple’s perceptions of outcome fairness are affected primarily by their
expectations or comparison to others’ outcomes.79 Lower status persons,
not just be about compliance with authority but also about challenging the legal or political
basis of authority).
75. See Ya-Ru Chen et al., When is It “a Pleasure to Do Business with You?”: The
Effects of Relative Status, Outcome Favorability, and Procedural Fairness, 92 ORG. BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 4 (2003).
76. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value
Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830, 835 n.4 (1989).
77. Id. at 833. These two measures were averaged to form a Standing scale. Id.
78. See Chen et al., supra note 75, at 1; JANE W. ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: HOW
LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 76, 83 (1983) (“Un-
like the unsophisticated individual litigants, . . . institutional litigants” who made extensive
use of the arbitration program “appear[ed] to care little about qualitative aspects of the
hearing process” and “judge arbitration primarily on the basis of the outcomes it
delivers.”).
79. See Chen et al., supra note 75; Roselle L. Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in
the Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process and Case Characteristics, 29 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 323, 346–47 (1995) (reporting that disputants’ satisfaction with outcomes was influ-
enced primarily by outcome measures and, to a lesser but significant degree, by process
evaluations; noting that these results are “consistent with theories that maintain that out-
come satisfaction is influenced more by one’s assessment of the outcome compared with
expectations or with others’ outcomes than by the absolute outcome received”).
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however, are less likely to be confident regarding what they are entitled
to receive, more concerned about the potential for exploitation, and thus
more likely to need to determine how much they can trust a higher status
person.80 For lower status people, attending to procedural cues represents
a coping mechanism to help them deal with uncertainty regarding out-
come fairness. As a result, for these people, strong procedural justice
reduces the influence of outcome favorability upon their perceptions of
substantive justice.
There is even biological support for the value of using the assessment
of procedural justice as a coping mechanism. Being treated in a manner
that is dignified, feels safe, and reduces stress has been shown to have a
positive physiological effect that enhances people’s cognitive ability and
decision-making.81 Thus, it makes sense that procedural justice will be
particularly important for those dealing with vulnerability or uncer-
tainty.82 It also makes sense that the provision of procedural justice will
exercise less influence upon the judgments of those who do not expect to
experience vulnerability or uncertainty.83 In fact, there is research sug-
gesting that when higher status persons perceive that they have received
80. See Joel Brockner, Batia M. Wiesenfeld & Kristina A. Diekmann, Towards a
“Fairer” Conception of Process Fairness: Why, When and How More May Not Always be
Better than Less, 3 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 183, 183–216 (2009) (those who are certain of
outcomes have less need for procedural fairness and thus do not notice it as much).
81. See Jill S. Tanz & Martha K. McClintock, The Physiologic Stress Response During
Mediation, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 29, 51–53 (2017) (discussing the “sweet spot” in
cortisol production for problem solving and decision-making and how mediators can and
should address disparities between mediating parties in the extent to which stressors may
affect them); see also Keith G. Allred, Relationship Dynamics in Disputes: Replacing Con-
tention with Cooperation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 83, 92 (Michael L.
Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (noting that perceptions of fair process lead to
more trust and loyalty).
82. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotia-
tion: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 473, 477 (2008) (citing E. Allan Lind, Fairness Judgments as Cognitions, in THE
JUSTICE MOTIVE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 416 (Michael Ross & Dale T. Miller eds., 2002); Kees
van den Bos & E. Allan Lind, Uncertainty Management by Means of Fairness Judgments,
34 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 26–30 (2002)); see also Nancy A. Welsh &
Barbara Gray, Searching for a Sense of Control: The Challenge Presented by Community
Conflicts over Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 295
(2002).
83. See Kees van den Bos et al., When Do We Need Procedural Fairness? The Role of
Trust in Authority, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1449, 1452 (1998) (reporting re-
search showing that procedural justice information was not as necessary when the author-
ity had a trustworthy reputation while there was heavy reliance on procedural justice
information when no reputational information was provided). Procedurally just treatment
has also been found to be more important to, and more influential for, those who define
and evaluate themselves based on their relationships with others or believe that social in-
teractions should affirm basic moral values. See Joel Brockner et al, The Influence of Inter-
dependent Self-Construal on Procedural Fairness Effects, 96 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 155, 155 (2005). There is also research that is beginning to demon-
strate that people’s roles correlate to the heightened importance of certain elements of
procedural justice. For example, one field study (in Germany) has found that observers of
court procedures are much more likely to focus on dignified treatment than on voice, con-
sideration, or even-handed treatment. See Susanne Beier et al., Influence of Judges’ Behav-
iors on Perceived Procedural Justice, 44 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 46 (2014).
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high procedural justice from a lower status person, they are likely to focus
even more strongly on outcome favorability in deciding whether to judge
the outcome as fair.84 For them, procedural justice does not soften the
blow of an adverse outcome. Rather, procedural justice may sharpen the
blow because the occurrence of an adverse outcome as a result of a pro-
cedurally fair process calls into question the higher status person’s self-
conception.85
Finally, there is somewhat counter-intuitive research suggesting that
people with low self-esteem and those who are highly committed to
avoiding unfavorable outcomes but are certain they are going to lose ac-
tually do not prefer procedurally just processes. Indeed, they prefer pro-
cedurally unjust processes because they can then blame the processes for
adverse outcomes. If the process were procedurally just, these individuals
would have to blame themselves for not doing all they could to win—
while they were sure they were going to lose.86
C. STATUS AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE DESIRE AND ABILITY
TO EXERCISE VOICE
There is also an increasing amount of research focusing on the element
of voice, and some of this research is particularly problematic in consider-
ing how inequality, bias, and prejudice may undermine the potential of
mediation to offer procedural justice and a forum in which people’s au-
thentic voices and experiences can be expressed.
84. See Chen et al., supra note 75, at 1 (finding in experiments—one involving negotia-
tion between higher status and lower status parties and a second involving the allocation of
rewards between customer service representatives and supervisors—”high procedural fair-
ness heightened the positive relationship between outcome favorability and desire for fu-
ture interaction”). These researchers explain that higher status people “are more self-
focused” than lower status people and use procedural fairness information (in conjunction
with outcome favorability) more than lower status people do to determine how much they
will be able to maintain existing conceptions of their status. On the one hand, social en-
counters that combine favorable outcomes and fair procedures on the other’s part enable
higher status individuals to maintain their existing self-perceptions. Consequently, higher
status people will strongly desire future interaction with other parties under such condi-
tions. On the other hand, social encounters that combine unfavorable outcomes and fair
procedures on the other’s part will be unwelcomed by higher status people insofar as these
conditions threaten their existing self-perceptions.
Id. at 6 (citing Dacher Keltner et al., Power, Approach, and Inhibition, 110 PSYCHOL. REV.
265 (2003)).
85. See id. at 6. On the other hand, prospect theory indicates that those who believe
themselves entitled to a procedurally just process are quite likely to notice if they fail to
receive such treatment. See Heather Pincock & Timothy Hedeen, Where the Rubber Meets
the Clouds: Anticipated Developments in Conflict and Conflict Resolution Theory, 30 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 431, 436 (2016) (discussing prospect theory). This research suggests
that there is no particular advantage to providing a procedurally just process when dealing
with higher status parties, but negative consequences may follow from the failure to pro-
vide a procedurally just process.
86. See Brockner, Wiesenfeld & Diekmann, supra note 80, at 188–90, 194–98 (describ-
ing research showing that people with lower self-esteem “felt significantly more self-veri-
fied [and their need for consistency was met] when told the event was handled with lower
process fairness” while their level of commitment to an institution and its authorities was
not affected by low process fairness).
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1. Voice That Affects Perceptions of Procedural Justice
As noted earlier, the expression of voice is central to both procedural
justice and self-determination.87 It is important, however, to identify the
particular aspects of voice that are valuable in mediation. Roselle Wissler
has conducted important research on this topic. First, she has found that
people perceive that they have experienced the opportunity for voice and
a procedurally just process in mediation if their lawyers speak on their
behalf. Second, she has found that people’s perceptions of voice are even
stronger if they have the opportunity to “tell their stories” themselves.
Third, Wissler has found a distinction between voice and “participation.”
In her research, while people’s perceptions of procedural justice are
strongly related to their perception that they had a sufficient opportunity
for voice, their perceptions of procedural justice are much less strongly
related to the extent of their direct participation in the mediation.88 In-
deed, Wissler found that those who spoke more in both domestic rela-
tions and civil mediation sessions were more likely to feel pressured to
settle.89 This research suggests a disconnect between the voice that is im-
portant to procedural justice and the sort of participation that is often90
associated with self-determination—i.e., the opportunity to participate di-
rectly in the back-and-forth or bargaining of negotiation and mediation. I
conducted qualitative research similarly suggesting that, in hierarchical
systems, those with less power are quite likely to value the opportunity to
express what is important to them while not valuing the opportunity to
participate in the bargaining or negotiation process.91
87. Voice also is central to procedural due process and, some would argue, rule of law.
See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law:
Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 10 (2011)
(“Because the legal system in the United States is adversarial and relies on parties to pre-
sent their own evidence, this in turn links voice and an opportunity to be heard with princi-
ples of rule of law.”); Welsh, Hollow Promise, supra note 57, at 187 (observing that while
voice and procedural due process certainly apply to adjudicative procedures, it is much
more difficult to apply them to consensual procedures).
88. See Wissler, Representation in Mediation, supra note 35, at 447–52 (distinguishing
between clients’ direct participation and indirect participation as their lawyers negotiated
on their behalf); Roselle L. Wissler, Party Participation and Voice in Mediation, DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Fall 2011, at 20; see also Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra note
52, at 969, 972 (finding that in a variety of dispute resolution processes other than media-
tion, tort litigants’ sense of control over the way their case was handled was strongly re-
lated to procedural fairness judgments, while how much they felt they “participated in the
process of disposing” of their case was not).
89. See Wissler, Representation in Mediation, supra note 35, at 449–50; see also Wissler,
Common Pleas, supra, note 56, at viii.
90. Importantly, the exercise of self-determination does not require participation in
the back-and-forth of negotiation. People can also exercise meaningful (although perhaps
thinner) self-determination in choosing among predetermined options or in choosing to
veto a single proposed solution. See Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note 4, at 44–46
(describing this definition of self-determination).
91. Parents participating in special education mediation sessions generally expressed a
desire for, and appreciation of, the opportunity to express themselves but were much less
likely to anticipate or value the opportunity to listen and try to understand school officials
or negotiate with them. See Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass, supra note
7, at 581.
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Meanwhile, voice is not always pretty or easy to hear. Voice can be
angry, aggressive, and cause discomfort, both for the person expressing it
and the person listening to such expression.92 Such voice, with a strong
emotional content, is often called “venting” in mediation.93 Although me-
diation commentators acknowledge venting as valuable when new infor-
mation is being shared (including revealing emotional impacts and
needs),94 they increasingly criticize the notion that venting is valuable for
its own sake. There is physiological evidence, for example, that allowing a
party to vent too much is not effective in helping with the release of diffi-
cult feelings and instead has the opposite effect. Continued venting, par-
ticularly in the presence of the other party, can result in heightened
cortisol levels, which can then lead to greater entrenchment in negative
feelings such as anger, as well as distorted perceptions that can inhibit
problem-solving and decision-making.95 Thus, unrestrained venting can
92. Being evaluated negatively and not having a sense of control are reported to be
among the most serious psychological stressors that exist, leading to heightened levels of
cortisol that then affect perceptions and attributions. See Tanz & McClintock, supra note
81, at 37 (citing Sally S. Dickerson & Margaret E. Kemeny, Acute Stressors and Cortisol
Responses: A Theoretical Integration and Synthesis of Laboratory Research, 130 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 355 (2004)). This research appears to be consistent with findings from other research
regarding the fundamental attribution error. This research has established that situational
influences strongly affect our judgments. See Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His
Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173, 184–87 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977); Michael W. Morris,
Richard P. Larrick & Steven K. Su, Misperceiving Negotiation Counterparts: When Situa-
tionally Determined Bargaining Behaviors Are Attributed to Personality Traits, 77 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 52, 53 (1999); Keith G. Allred, Anger and Retaliation in
Conflict: The Role of Attribution, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 236, 240–41 (Morton Deutsch et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006) (noting that “research
indicates that in observing a person at an airport yelling at an airline agent, one tends to
over-attribute the behavior to bad temper and underattribute it to circumstances, such as
having recently been the victim of recurring unfair treatment by the airline”). We are more
likely to take into account situational factors to explain our own behavior. Edward E.
Jones & Richard E. Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the
Causes of Behavior, in ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 79, 80 (Ed-
ward E. Jones et al. eds., 1972). Research further indicates that we are even more likely to
attribute negative behaviors to a person’s character or disposition if that person is not a
member of our own social group. Meanwhile, venting strong emotions in front of an adver-
sary in a mediation session also can represent a stressor that raises cortisol levels. See Tanz
& McClintock, supra note 81, at 37, 45.
93. See Tanz & McClintock, supra note 81, at 59–60.
94. Id. at 59.
95. Id. at 60, 66 (citing Brad J. Bushman et al., Chewing on It Can Chew You Up:
Effects of Rumination on Triggered Displaced Aggression, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 969, 974 (2005); Kenneth F. Dunham, I Hate You, but We Can Work It Out:
Dealing with Anger Issues in Mediation, 12 APPALACHIAN J.L. 191 (2013); Tammy Lenski,
Venting Anger: A Good Habit to Break, MEDIATE.COM (May 2011), http://www.mediate
.com/articles/LenskiTbl20110516.cfm [https://perma.cc/Y3NT-6AMK]; Dominik Mis-
chkowski et al., Flies on the Wall Are Less Aggressive: Self-Distancing “in the Heat of the
Moment” Reduces Aggressive Thoughts, Angry Feelings and Aggressive Behavior, 48 J. EX-
PERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1187, 1187–91 (2012)). Tanz and McClintock note that there
may be a difference between men and women in their response to negative emotions, with
women being more likely than men to inhibit such emotions and begin problem-solving. Id.
at 49–51. Tanz and McClintock also report that women are more likely to respond to stress
with a tend-and-befriend intervention, thus increasing social ties and resources. Id. at
68–69 (citing Shelley E. Taylor et al., Biobehavioral Responses to Stress in Females: Tend-
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chill communications that are likely to be productive in terms of produc-
ing settlement in mediation.96
At the very least, this research regarding the physiological effects of
venting suggests that there can be a “right” and a “wrong” sort of voice in
mediation.97 At this point, it is not clear who is more likely to exercise the
wrong sort of voice in mediation, but this research raises legitimate con-
cerns that mediators who seek to place restrictions on venting ultimately
could chill the expression of righteous anger and fear by those feeling the
effects of inequality, bias, and prejudice.98
2. Status and the Willingness to Exercise Voice
Research also reveals that we cannot assume that those who perceive
that they have been ignored, excluded, or disrespected will be willing or
able to exercise their voice at all. Robert Rubinson has written quite pas-
sionately about the difficulties facing low-income participants who are re-
quired to participate in court-connected mediation. They may not be able
to get child care. Their reliance on public transportation could make it
difficult for them to travel to the courthouse. They may have to forego
hourly wages and may fear the loss of their jobs if they fail to turn up for
work in order to participate in mediation.99  These difficulties make it
unlikely that people will be able to afford the luxury of voice.
and-Befriend, Not Fight-or-Flight, 107 PSYCHOL. REV. 411 (2000)). Stressed men are likely
to become more cognitively rigid and entrenched and engage in tend-and-befriend only
with those they already know and trust. Id. at 60, 69 (citing Bernadette von Dawans et al.,
The Social Dimension of Stress Reactivity: Acute Stress Increases Prosocial Behavior in
Humans, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 651, 658 (2012)). See also Welton et al., The Role of Caucusing,
supra note 24, at 183–85 (describing in some detail how presenting in front of the other
disputant is problematic); Pincock & Hedeen, supra note 85, at 436 (asserting the need to
revise theory positing that disputants have the emotional and mental capacity to “transi-
tion rather abruptly from . . . describing their conflict to solving their problem through
generating ideas and forecasting their utility”) (citing Richard Birke, Neuroscience and
Settlement: An Examination of Scientific Innovations and Practical Applications, 25 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 477, 510–12 (2010)).
96. In the context of online dispute resolution, eBay and Paypal structured their plat-
form to avoid soliciting consumers’ open-ended text answers—instead requiring them to
choose from a predetermined list—due to the likelihood that the consumers’ responses
would be negative and thereby chill productive negotiation with merchants. See AMY
SCHMITZ & COLIN RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE
FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 36–39 (2017).
97. See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 44–51 (1990) (examining how White’s
client’s voice during their counseling session was quite different from the voice she used
when meeting with the caseworker; discussing restrictions on voice, its relationship to par-
ticipation, power disparity, and safety).
98. In a related vein, Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow has suggested that in focusing
on individual negotiators’ behaviors or even the interactions between negotiators, we have
perhaps “been naı̈ve about the social structural conditions under which integrative negotia-
tion can most optimally occur” and that we need to identify the “socioeconomic and politi-
cal conditions [under which we can] actually get to yes by negotiating fairly, equitably, and
wisely to achieve joint and mutual gain.” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why Hasn’t the World
Gotten to Yes? An Appreciation and Some Reflections, 22 NEGOT. J. 485, 499 (2006).
99. See Robert Rubinson, Of Grids and Gatekeepers: The Socioeconomics of Media-
tion, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL., 873, 891–92 (2016).
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Recent research also has demonstrated that people’s willingness or
ability to exercise their voice will depend, in large part, upon their identi-
fication with the relevant social group. In this research, the more people
felt themselves to be part of a social group, the more they desired and
expected voice in matters relevant to group membership. The less they
identified with the social group, however, the less they desired and ex-
pected voice. Thus, despite the centrality of voice in the procedural jus-
tice literature, we cannot assume that everyone will always and uniformly
have a high desire for voice.100 Those who do not feel part of the relevant
social group—i.e., those who are marginalized or perceive that others are
prejudiced against them—are likely to be less willing to exercise voice.
Indeed, they are likely to be aware that their exercise of voice could sub-
ject them to heightened attention and negative consequences.101 People
with higher status and greater identification in a social group, meanwhile,
are more likely to exercise voice—and more likely to expect to exercise
more voice.102 Interestingly, researchers noted that this may mean that
people with higher status may actually be willing to trade their voice for
something they want even more—i.e., a favorable outcome:
[L]ower-status individuals or groups might demand voice precisely
for its instrumental properties. At the same time, higher-status indi-
viduals and groups—particularly legitimately higher-status individu-
als and groups—may feel sufficiently confident in their positions that
they would be willing to forgo voice (i.e. express a relatively low de-
sire for voice) in favour of alternative rules such as unbiased deci-
sion-making, precisely because the unbiased decision maker ought to
recognize their legitimately higher status and afford them the material
benefits normatively associated with it.103
100. See Michael J. Platow et al., Social Identification Predicts Desires and Expectations
for Voice, 28 SOC. JUST. RES. 526, 527 (2015). These researchers also observed, however,
that people’s desire for voice generally is greater than their expectations regarding whether
they will have voice. Id. at 545.
101. See, e.g., Doron Dorfman, Re-Claiming Disability: Identity, Procedural Justice, and
the Disability Determination Process, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 195, 214–15 (2017) (describ-
ing how persons with disabilities who identify with the medical-individual model of disabil-
ity do not necessarily want or need voice while those who identify with the social model of
disability appreciate voice but also fear negative consequences of exercising voice in the
disability determination process); Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass, supra
note 7, at 653–54 n.337 (suggesting this dynamic for parents of children with special needs);
James A. Wall, Jr. & Suzanne Chan-Serafin, Do Mediators Walk Their Talk in Civil Cases?,
28 CONFLICT RESOL. QUARTERLY 3, 16 (2010) (finding that mediators tended to use evalu-
ative or pressing strategies even when they said they would employ a neutral style, and
such strategies were used most often with plaintiffs engaging in behavior the mediators
perceived as too demanding or competitive); see also Welsh, I Could Have Been a Con-
tender, supra note 63, at 1168–71 (citing research demonstrating that women who make
demands and negotiate assertively are more likely than men to be judged harshly, parties
who have suffered discrimination are particularly unlikely to bring claims, employer-re-
spondents tend to refuse the EEOC’s invitation to mediate discrimination matters, and
status quo bias tends to favor dominant parties and disfavor marginalized parties).
102. See Platow et al., supra note 100, at 526–49.
103. Id. at 545–46.
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Related research indicates that people’s desire for, and expectation of,
voice also is affected by the power distance culture of their national or
organizational setting. In those nations with low power distance cul-
tures104 (i.e., more egalitarian cultures), voice is expected and its legiti-
macy is high. When people in these nations experience lower levels of
voice, they react negatively. In nations with high power distance cul-
tures105 (i.e., more hierarchical cultures), people’s reactions to “low
voice” are less negative. The researchers noted that “[a] central premise
of the procedural justice literature—based on studies conducted mainly
in the United States—is that people react unfavorably when they have
little voice in a decision-making process.”106 These studies show that peo-
ple’s desire for voice and their expectation that they will have voice are
very likely to vary depending upon their culture, its power distance, and
their placement in a relevant hierarchy.
Upon examination, it becomes clear that voice is neither a simple con-
cept nor one that we can take for granted in the context of mediation. It
is not magic. Rather, voice may be quite limited. Voice of the wrong sort
can produce physiological effects that make it less effective in producing
solutions. And people in a hierarchical setting who know they are
marginalized may not expect voice or may choose not to exercise voice
because they perceive, quite rationally, that it may cause them harm.107
D. STATUS AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE DESIRE AND ABILITY TO
PROVIDE TRUSTWORTHY CONSIDERATION
As noted earlier, procedural justice research generally reveals that
while people care about the opportunity for voice, they also care about
whether their voice has been heard—i.e., whether their views were con-
sidered in a trustworthy manner. Most of the research focuses on whether
an authority figure or decision-maker—e.g., a judge, police officer, or su-
pervisor—has demonstrated trustworthy consideration. Notice that the
people in these roles tend to be third parties, not engaged directly in the
dispute. Indeed, researchers have long raised doubts about the ability of
104. The United States and Germany were the low power distance countries examined
in this study.
105. China, Mexico, and Hong Kong were the high power distance countries examined
in this study.
106. Joel Brockner et al., Culture and Procedural Justice: The Influence of Power Dis-
tance on Reactions to Voice, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 300, 301 (2001). The
researchers determined the effect of low or high voice by examining the level of organiza-
tional commitment. Id. But see Stephen La Tour et al., Procedure: Transnational Perspec-
tives and Preferences, 86 YALE L.J. 258, 281 (1976); E. Allan Lind et al., Reactions to
Procedural Models for Adjudicative Conflict Resolution: A Cross-National Study, 22 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 218, 335 (1978); E Allan Lind et al., Procedural Context and Culture:
Variation in the Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 767, 777 (1997).
107. This research is reminiscent of the story told in White, supra note 97, in which the
client chose to tell one story—the real story—to her lawyer and then told another story—
the one that would fit a stereotype and yield the result she needed—when dealing with her
welfare officer.
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the disputing parties involved in a mediation to truly listen to each
other.108 Relatively recently, however, researchers have discovered that
the procedural justice perceptions of parties trying to resolve disputes in
mediation depend very much on whether the other party—who shares
decision-making authority in this consensual process—demonstrated
trustworthy consideration.109
Trustworthy consideration is a concept that bears similarities to several
others: active or reflective listening,110 “looping,”111 perspective tak-
ing,112 open-minded listening,113 testing for understanding,114 and em-
pathizing.115 There are three key questions here: “Did the authority (or
other) listen to what I said?” “Did the authority (or other) understand
what I said?” “Did the authority (or other) care to understand what I
said?” Research indicates that people tend to judge accurate proce-
dures—i.e., those in which the decision maker or authority takes all rele-
vant information into account in coming to a decision—as fairer than
inaccurate procedures.116
As with voice, there is research indicating that inequality, bias, and
prejudice can get in the way of listening to someone else’s perspective,
accurately understanding what she has said, and caring to understand her
perspective. Research regarding the fundamental attribution bias, for ex-
ample, shows that when someone has hurt us and is not in our social
108. See, e.g., Welton et al., The Role of Caucusing, supra note 24, at 185 (“Joint ses-
sions encourage disputants to simply repeat their official positions over and over rather
than to explore these positions or listen to one another.”).
109. See Tina Nabatchi et al., Organizational Justice and Workplace Mediation: A Six-
Factor Model, 18 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 148 (2007) (reporting, in the context of a trans-
formative mediation program, the statistical significance of whether the other party heard
and understood).
110. See Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client
Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755, 758–62 (2004).
111. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 64–65 (2000); LEO-
NARD I. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 83–84 (5th ed. 2013).
112. See Douglas N. Frenkel & James H. Stark, Improving Lawyers’ Judgment: Is Medi-
ation Training De-Biasing?, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 34–41 (2015).
113. See Jonathan R. Cohen, “Open-Minded Listening”, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 139,
142–43 (2014).
114. See NEIL RACKHAM, MODELS FOR EXPLAINING BEHAVIOR: INTERACTIVE SKILLS
PROGRAM (1995) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
115. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Deeply Contacting the Inner World of Another: Prac-
ticing Empathy in Values-Based Negotiation Role Plays, 39 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 189
(2012); Robert H. Mnookin et al., The Tension Between Empathy and Assertiveness, 12
NEGOT. J. 217, 219 (1996); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Teaching a New Negotiation Skills
Paradigm, 39 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 29–30 (2012).
116. See Jan-Willem Van Prooijen et al., Procedural Justice and Status: Status Salience as
Antecedent of Procedural Fairness Effects, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1353, 1357
(2002) (describing manipulation of procedural accuracy in experiment and noting that it
represented “an alternative way to study procedural fairness”); see also Chen et al., supra
note 75, at 15 (describing a “high procedural fairness condition” as one in which the deci-
sion-maker wrote “I carefully scored the forms, and I saw that you did X percent of the
work, so I thought it’d be fair to give you Y of the 10 tickets,” while in a “low procedural
fairness condition,” the decision-maker wrote “I didn’t bother to score the forms, but X is
my lucky number, so I’m giving you Y percent of the tickets”).
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group, we are more likely to over-attribute her bad behavior to her essen-
tial character and under-attribute it to the situation in which she found
herself. We are more forgiving of those in our in-group and even more
forgiving of ourselves.117 This psychological phenomenon is likely to im-
pede our ability or desire to listen and really understand the voice of
someone who is not in our social group.
There is also research showing that status can impede trustworthy con-
sideration. Those who have higher status and greater power have been
shown to be less likely to be trustworthy118 and thus less likely to provide
consideration that is trustworthy. Worryingly, there is even research sug-
gesting that people naturally associate the failure to provide procedural
justice with power and assume that someone who has behaved in a proce-
durally just manner is less powerful.119 The failure of those with higher
status and greater power to extend trustworthy consideration has been
attributed to their reduced need for others’ help. This phenomenon also
may be self-protective. Bob Mnookin has suggested that one of the great
challenges of a similar skill, empathizing, is that it seems to require sym-
pathy, agreement, or even the assumption of responsibility and blame for
another’s pain—i.e., “the fear that I’m being asked to characterize my
own decision as immoral.”120
This research demonstrates that placing two people in the same room
in the presence of a mediator does not guarantee that either will provide
the other with trustworthy consideration. Trustworthy consideration, like
self-determination and voice, is not magic.
But can something be done to achieve many of the benefits of procedu-
ral justice while also recognizing that certain people—e.g., those who are
lower status in a hierarchical system, those who have been marginalized
within a social group, and ultimately those who are likely to be among the
marginalized—may need assistance in exercising their voice, while other
people—e.g., those who are higher status—may need assistance with
demonstrating trustworthy consideration?
117. Allred, supra note 92; Morris, Larrick & Su, supra note 92. See Ross, supra note
92.
118. See DAVID DESTENO, THE TRUTH ABOUT TRUST: HOW IT DETERMINES SUCCESS
IN LIFE, LOVE, LEARNING, AND MORE 129–144 (2014) (summarizing research that has
shown that trustworthiness is affected by context—e.g., an experience of increased status
(even if temporary) leads to a reduced sense of needing others’ help and an increased
sense of self-reliance that then results in reduced trust, reduced trustworthiness, and in-
creased lying; as social class goes up, trustworthiness also declines).
119. See Brockner, Wiesenfeld & Diekmann, supra note 80, at 157 n.2.
120. Jean R. Sternlight et al., Making Peace with Your Enemy: Nelson Mandela and His
Contributions to Conflict Resolution, 16 NEV. L.J. 281, 306 (2016) (transcription of panel-
ists Jean R. Sternlight, Andrea Schneider, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Robert Mnookin,
Richard Goldstone, and Penelope Andrews on Nov. 1, 2014 at the Saltman Center for
Conflict Resolution, William S. Boyd School of Law, Thomas and Mack Moot Courtroom).
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V. POTENTIAL RESPONSES
The following potential responses represent just a beginning in trying
to address the potential for inequality, bias, and prejudice to undermine
mediation’s potential to deliver procedural justice, substantive justice,
and self-determination. The first response focuses on mediators, their
commitment to procedural justice and self-determination, and the role
that their social identities play in conveying a message of equal treatment,
inclusivity, and the safety of a neutral forum. The second response fo-
cuses on the use of caucuses, primarily before the formal mediation ses-
sion begins, in order to foster all parties’ voice, their sense of belonging,
trustworthy consideration by the mediator, and trust in the mediation fo-
rum. The third response examines the potential to enhance the parties’
ability to provide each other with trustworthy consideration. The fourth
response considers whether online technologies may be used to increase
voice, trustworthy consideration, even-handed treatment, and respect—
and also increase real, substantive self-determination and access to justice
through access to important information. The fifth response asks whether
mediators should have some responsibility to avoid patently unconsciona-
ble results.
A. INCREASING THE INCLUSIVITY OF THE POOL OF MEDIATORS AND
TRAINING ALL MEDIATORS TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND
ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS
There is no doubt that courts and public and private dispute resolution
providers must increase the inclusivity of their pools of mediators,121 in-
clude underrepresented demographics (e.g., professional women and
people of color) in the lists of potential mediators sent to parties,122 and
mentor and promote professional women and people of color as
mediators.123 The presence of such mediators will signal greater inclusiv-
121. See Beth Trent, Deborah Masucci & Timothy Lewis, The Dismal State of Diversity:
Mapping a Chart for Change, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2014, at 21, 21; see also Marvin E.
Johnson & Maria R. Volpe, The Color of Money: Compensation Opportunities and Barri-
ers, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2017, at 14; Susan D. Franck et al., The Diversity Chal-
lenge: Exploring the “Invisible College” of International Arbitration, 53 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 429 (2015); Benjamin G. Davis, Diversity in International Arbitration, DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Winter 2014, at 13, 13; Deborah Rothman, Gender Diversity in Arbitrator
Selection, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2012, at 22; Marvin E. Johnson & Homer C. La Rue,
The Gated Community: Risk Aversion, Race, and the Lack of Diversity in Mediation in the
Top Ranks, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2009, at 17; Maria R. Volpe et al., Barriers to
Participation: Challenges Faced by Members of Underrepresented Racial and Ethnic
Groups in Entering, Remaining, and Advancing in the ADR Field, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
119 (2008); F. Peter Phillips, ADR Continental Drift: It Remains a White, Male Game,
NAT’L L.J. Nov. 27, 2006.
122. See Gina Viola Brown & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Gender Differences in Dispute
Resolution Practice: Report on the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Practice Snapshot
Survey, 47 AKRON L. REV. 975 (2015); Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Gina Viola Brown,
Gender Differences in Dispute Resolution Practice, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2014, at 36.
123. See Noah Hanft, Making Diversity Happen in ADR: No More Lip Service, 257
N.Y.L.J. (2017) (reporting that “CPR saw an 81 percent increase in the selection of women
and diverse neutrals in FY16, with women and minorities accounting for 26 percent of
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ity and safety for all.124 From the perspective of the procedural justice
literature, increasing the diversity of the pool of mediators should en-
hance marginalized parties’ willingness to perceive that they will be, and
were, heard and understood, therefore increasing marginalized parties’
willingness to exercise voice and increasing the likelihood of actual un-
derstanding and trustworthy consideration—which may then reduce the
likelihood of unjustifiably disparate outcomes.125 There are hopeful signs
that public and private dispute resolution providers126 and other organi-
zations127 are moving in this direction.
Carol Izumi has written comprehensively about the presence and influ-
ence of implicit bias in mediation128 and is writing more for this sympo-
selections”); We Embrace Diversity, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/diversity/ [https://per
ma.cc/Y9J2-YUPL] (last visited Aug. 5, 2017) (reporting “an overall composition of 22%
female and 9% persons of color among our distinguished panelists”); Putting Diversity into
Practice, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_reposi
tory/AAA_ICDR_Diversity_Initiative.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4JB-WALM] (reporting that
the 2015 roster of arbitrators and mediators “[was] composed of 22% women and minori-
ties”; also describing the AAA Higginbotham Fellows Program established “in 2009 to
provide training, networking, and mentorship for up-and-coming diverse ADR practition-
ers”; and offering “to provide arbitrator lists to parties comprising at least 20% diverse
panelists where party qualifications are met”); see also FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION
TASK FORCE, Final Report and Recommendations of the FINRA Dispute Resolution Task
Force, at 8–10 (December 16, 2015) (describing FINRA’s efforts to recruit and promote
arbitrators who are women and people of color); Comments of ABA Section of Dispute
Resolution for FINRA Dispute Resolution Task Force (May 1, 2015) (recommendation to
increase and track use of arbitrators and mediators who are women, people of color, and
people with disabilities).
124. See Lorig Charkoudian & Ellen Kabcenell Wayne, Fairness, Understanding, and
Satisfaction: Impact of Mediator and Participant Race and Gender on Participants’ Percep-
tion of Mediation, 28 CONFL. RESOL. Q. 23, 47 (2010) (based on empirical study urging the
matching of mediators with disputants by gender (which may require use of co-mediators);
regarding race and ethnicity, urging co-mediation or avoiding a mediator-participant match
altogether in order to avoid isolating any disputant “who will feel outnumbered and disad-
vantaged in a process where the opponent and the neutral seem to have so much in
common”).
125. See Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants’ Ethnicity and Gen-
der on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 767, 789–90 (1996) (reporting no disparity in outcomes based on gender alone but
that “both minority male and female claimants received significantly lower MORs [mone-
tary outcome ratios]—even when we included the nine case-specific and repeat-player vari-
ables. Of greatest concern is the fact that this disparity was only present in cases mediated
by at least one Anglo mediator. Cases mediated by two minorities [in a co-mediator team]
resulted in lower MORs, regardless of claimant ethnicity . . . . Of particular importance is
our finding of no significant ethnic disparities in cases mediated by two minority
mediators.”); see also Daniel Klerman & Lisa Klerman, Inside the Caucus: An Empirical
Analysis of Mediation from Within, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 686, 689, 715 (2015)
(reporting that “settlement rates [were] the same for male and female plaintiffs and law-
yers” and that “[w]omen and men fared equally well in the mediations studied here,
whether as plaintiffs or lawyers”).
126. See supra note 123.
127. See Letter from Nancy A. Welsh, Chair-Elect, ABA Section of Dispute Resolu-
tion, to Monica Jackson, Office of the Executive Secretary, Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau 4-5 (July 29, 2016) (observing that ICANN’s publication of UDRP decisions “has
permitted patterns of decision making and institutions’ repeat appointments of arbitrators
to be highlighted”).
128. See Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 71 (2010). Others have written about the influence of implicit bias upon
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sium. In this Article, I will suggest only that requiring mediators to
practice “considering the opposite” has been shown to be effective in re-
ducing bias.129
B. PRE-MEDIATION CAUCUSING WITH PARTIES TO INCREASE THE
LIKELIHOOD AND PRODUCTIVITY OF VOICE
Earlier, this Article expressed concerns regarding lawyers’ increasing
tendency to avoid joint sessions in mediation and to request mediators
whose mediation sessions occur entirely in caucus. Indeed, recent re-
search has indicated that in certain contexts extensive caucusing does not
necessarily increase the likelihood of settlement,130 while it can reduce
parties’ belief in their ability to work together.131
From a procedural justice perspective, however, targeted and careful
use of caucus may have the effect of enhancing the voice of those who are
hesitant to exercise it (i.e., those who are of lower status or who do not
identify with the “social group” being served by the mediation). Targeted
and careful use of caucus also may increase the likelihood that people
feel and believe that their views received trustworthy consideration and
respect. Thus, used appropriately, caucusing has the potential to help par-
ties gain the benefits of procedural justice.
Several years ago, I conducted a small qualitative empirical research
project involving special education mediation.132 To my surprise, caucus
emerged as very significant to the parents and school officials who partici-
pated in the mediation sessions. It was a potent tool. In some cases, the
mediators chose to allow initial presentations in a joint session and then
engaged in shuttle diplomacy. One participant expressed appreciation of
this approach because he “—like many others—. . . valued the way in
which caucus simultaneously permitted bargaining and buffered both the
parents and him from the negative emotions often triggered by distribu-
judges in the facilitation of settlement, motion practice and adjudication. See, e.g., WIS-
TRICH & RACHLINSKI, supra note 61; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Processing Pleadings and the
Psychology of Prejudgment, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 413, 428 (2011) (reporting that judges,
like most human beings, make egocentric or self-serving judgments about their own abili-
ties; for example, 97.2% of judges surveyed “indicated [that] they were better than the
median judge” in avoiding bias in judging and 87% described themselves as “better than
the median judge at facilitating settlements” (citing Chris Guthrie, Jefffrey J. Rachlinski &
Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive
Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1519 (2009))).
129. See Frenkel & Stark, supra note 112, at 22–24; see also Phyllis E. Bernard, What
Some Theories Say; What Some Mediators Know, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2009, at 6
(reporting on the effects of requiring mediators to reflect on the role of gender, race, and
socioeconomic class and the inclusion of such opportunities for reflection in the Early Set-
tlement Central Mediation Program in Oklahoma City).
130. See Mediation Research Task Force Report, supra note 37.
131. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, COURT OPERATIONS, MD. JUDICIARY, WHAT
WORKS IN CHILD ACCESS MEDIATION: EFFECTIVENESS OF VARIOUS MEDIATION STRATE-
GIES ON SHORT- AND LONG-TERM OUTCOMES (2016); Lorig Charkoudian, Deborah
Thompson Eisenberg & Jamie L. Walter, What Difference Does ADR Make? Comparison
of ADR and Trial Outcomes in Small Claims Court, 35 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 7 (2017).
132. See Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass, supra note 7, at 580.
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tive negotiation tactics.”133 Other school officials and parents similarly
found that the use of caucus kept mediation from “get[ting] out of con-
trol,” “eliminated the arguments,” and allowed the parties to “take a
deep breath, step back, take a look, and then come back to the table.”134
Some participants in this study also described how the use of caucus
significantly enhanced their perceptions of procedural justice. For
example,
both parents and school officials reacted positively to caucuses when
mediators used the technique to provide disputants with a full oppor-
tunity to tell their stories or spent time in caucus ensuring that they
understood what disputants were saying. . . . Mediators’ use of cau-
cus also garnered positive reviews when the technique assisted the
disputants in engaging in a thorough and dignified deliberative pro-
cess. For example, when the mediator in one case did not challenge
the disputants’ selection of a normative frame in caucus, but instead
assisted the disputants in a more careful examination and application
of the legal norms they had invoked, both the parent and the school
official accepted and valued the mediator’s evaluative
interventions.135
In other instances, however, the mediator’s use of caucus significantly
harmed the parties’ perceptions of procedural justice. “When [the partici-
pants] were uncertain that the mediator truly understood what they had
said and could not hear the mediator’s translation for themselves, they
raised concerns about the accuracy of what the mediator communicated
on their behalf” and “feared the potential effect of caucus on the quality
of the substantive outcomes achieved in mediation.”136 “The privacy of
caucus also may have encouraged some mediators to engage quickly in
more aggressive evaluative actions and statements, which disputants then
described as ‘adversarial,’ ‘impatient,’ and ‘going over the edge.’”137 For
instance, “when mediators used the privacy of caucus to try to persuade
disputants to accept the validity of the other side’s normative frame, both
parents and school officials questioned the mediators’ impartiality.”138 Fi-
nally, when mediators did not permit parents to make an initial presenta-
tion in joint session, did not disclose prior contact with school officials, or
“spen[t] so much time” with school officials, some parents became very
suspicious about the relationship between the school officials and
133. Id. at 647.
134. Id. at 650–51.
135. Id. at 650.
136. Id. at 647–48.
137. Id. at 648 (footnotes omitted); see also Welsh, Magistrate Judges, supra note 37, at
989 (providing examples of aggressive evaluation by judges in ex parte meetings during
settlement conferences).
138. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass, supra note 7, at 648. A Party’s
reaction is likely to be quite different if the mediator expresses understanding and appreci-
ation of the position being taken by that party. See, e.g., Welton et al., The Role of Caucus-
ing, supra note 24, at 200 (noting that “[c]aucusing allows mediators to take sides with one
party in order to move the process along. Thus it appears that caucusing somewhat relieves
the third party of the requirement of being strictly neutral between the two parties.”).
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mediators.139 Rather than experiencing a procedurally just mediation
process that fostered free, equal, and respectful dialogue, some of these
parents felt that they and their children had once again become marginal-
ized “odd men out” with officials talking behind their backs.140
Based on these reactions from parents and school officials, I suggested
that special education mediation could “borrow a page” from victim-of-
fender mediation, which regularly provides for pre-mediation caucus-
ing—generally conducted before the day of mediation, with the mediator
visiting the victim and the offender separately to prepare both of them to
participate in the mediation process.141 The goal is to help both partici-
pants identify their goals for the mediation session and prepare to achieve
those goals. In a very similar vein, Gary Friedman and Jack Himmelstein
recommend meeting with parties individually to help them come to their
own decisions about whether, why, and how they might use mediation.
Friedman and Himmelstein describe their mediation model as “under-
standing-based” and also specify that it is a “non-caucus approach”—but
their pre-mediation meetings with the parties also represent a sort of cau-
cus, one in which the focus is on welcoming the parties’ voice and provid-
ing respectful and trustworthy consideration.142
In the last few years, other commentators have similarly urged the use
of pre-mediation caucuses to enhance the quality of mediation sessions.
Jill Tanz and Martha McClintock, who have raised concerns regarding the
negative physiological effects of unrestrained venting in mediation, have
encouraged the responsive use of early caucuses to build trust in the me-
diation process and the mediator, learn what each party hopes to achieve,
gauge emotional levels, and plan. Such caucusing is designed to reduce
stress and anger and instead enhance trust, focus, problem-solving, and
decision-making.143 Other researchers have also recommended the use of
pre-mediation caucuses in order to build trust and specifically not to de-
velop settlement proposals.144 Still other commentators have recom-
mended the use of pre-mediation caucuses to assist individuals claiming
discrimination to prepare for the mediation process and place their expe-
139. Id. at 649.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 658.
142. See GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT: MEDIA-
TION THROUGH UNDERSTANDING xxxv-xxxvi (2008).
143. See Tanz & McClintock, supra note 81, at 55, 60, 62. Tanz and McClintock observe
that mediators trying to determine whether parties are experiencing stress may watch for
microaggressions (often targeted at women and people of color), which can signal that the
aggressor is experiencing stress and then engaging in displaced aggression. Id. at 65. Such
microaggressions then often cause stress in those who have been targeted. Id. Other re-
searchers are focusing on other physiological factors that influence decision-making. See,
e.g., Roy F. Baumeister et al., The Glucose Model of Mediation: Physiological Bases of
Willpower as Important Explanations for Common Mediation Behavior, 15 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 377 (2015); JEFFREY Z. RUBIN ET AL., SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALE-
MATE, AND SETTLEMENT 78–79 (2d ed. 1994) (excitation transfer effect).
144. See Roderick Swaab & Jeanne Brett, Caucus with Care: The Impact of
Pre–Mediation Caucuses on Conflict Resolution, IACM Meetings Paper at 2, 9 (2007).
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rience within a larger context.145 Finally, the researchers who examined
the use of labor mediation in the Netherlands, described earlier, also have
recommended pre-mediation caucusing, particularly with the subordi-
nates who cared so much about procedural justice and outside the pres-
ence of the supervisor, in order to avoid triggering hierarchical
relationships and dynamics.146
In all of these cases, the commentators and researchers have focused
on the use of pre-mediation and early caucusing to enhance parties’ trust
in the mediator and the process,147 affirm that each party is a valued
member of the group engaged in mediation, and help parties prepare for
their participation. It is noteworthy that these efforts also would have the
effect of encouraging the productive expression of voice and providing
evidence of trustworthy and respectful consideration by the mediator.
Of course, these recommendations also tend to assume that only good
things will happen in caucuses. As noted earlier, mediators and parties
generally use caucuses to move toward settlement.148 When mediators
focus too heavily or too quickly on settlement, however, they can under-
mine perceptions of procedural justice and self-determination. Some re-
searchers observing the parties’ behavior, meanwhile, have raised other
concerns. For example, when the parties are in caucus they are more
likely to speak quite strongly about their own cases and more disparag-
ingly about the other party.149 They also may use caucus to try to manipu-
late the mediator.150
145. See Emily M. Calhoun, Workplace Mediation: The First-Phase, Private Caucus in
Individual Discrimination Disputes, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 187, 189–90 (2004).
146. See Bollen, Ittner & Euwema, supra note 73, at 632.
147. See Welton et al., The Role of Caucusing in Mediation, supra note 24, at 182 (dis-
cussing the importance of caucus for the early development of rapport between mediator
and party).
148. See id. at 196 (noting the many positive consequences of using caucus: less direct
hostility between the parties, increased disclosure of information, more ideas for solutions
(perhaps because emotion and defensiveness are reduced and offering an idea is less likely
to be seen as a sign of weakness), increased requests from the mediator for information (in
contrast to joint session where such requests declined rapidly), more useful challenges by
the mediator, providing a route into problem-solving; also noting that caucuses are used
for different purposes at different stages of the mediation—e.g., greater likelihood of re-
quests for other disputant’s or mediator’s reactions to ideas in middle and late stage caucus
than in joint sessions; greater likelihood of mediator-generated alternatives in middle stage
caucus and then in final stage joint session).
149. See id. at 199 (reporting that caucus was used in about two-thirds of the commu-
nity mediations studied; about 35% of disputants’ statements occurred in caucus as com-
pared to joint session; and “[i]n cases that employed a caucus, disputants used more
persuasive arguments, made fewer requests for reaction to an alternative, and generated
fewer new alternatives. Mediators employed more negative evaluations of the parties’ be-
havior and less positive evaluations of their positions during these cases. These findings
suggest that mediators tend to call caucuses when disputants are taking a contentious, as
opposed to problem-solving, approach.”).
150. See DWIGHT GOLANN, SHARING A MEDIATOR’S POWER: EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY
IN SETTLEMENT 6–8, 50–52, 68–69, 83–87 (2013) (examples of lawyers’ use of mediation
and mediators to implement a distributive or competitive negotiation strategy); James R.
Coben, A Candid Look at Advocacy Strategies in Caucused Mediations, 7 DISP. RESOL.
MAG. 27 (Fall 2000);  Welton et al., The Role of Caucusing in Mediation, supra note 24, at
193–94 (reporting research regarding community mediation, finding that in caucus dispu-
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The lesson? Pre-mediation caucusing also is not magic. If it is used, its
purpose should be clear and constrained.  Mediators should be trained in
how to use it to develop trust, and courts encouraging or ordering parties’
use of mediation should institutionalize sufficient time for pre-mediation
caucuses as well as systems that provide for feedback and quality
assurance.151
C. REFLECTIVE LISTENING IN MEDIATION TO INCREASE THE
LIKELIHOOD AND PRODUCTIVITY OF TRUSTWORTHY
CONSIDERATION
As noted earlier, participants’ inability or unwillingness to extend trust-
worthy consideration to each other also can hinder mediation’s potential
to foster procedural justice and self-determination. But people can learn
the value of listening as a result of participating in mediation.152 People
also can learn at least the rudimentary components of active or reflective
listening—e.g., allowing the other party to speak and then trying to sum-
marize, accurately, what they believe the other party has said.153 Interest-
tants were more likely to engage in indirect hostile behavior (e.g., behavioral and character
putdowns of the other disputant), self-enhancement, and other persuasive arguments to
enhance their own position. “Though we cannot be sure from the data, it seems likely that
many of these statements were less than truthful . . . . That such statements could neverthe-
less have an impact on the mediator is suggested by the finding that mediators tend to
recommend solutions that favor the side that has been most vigorous in presenting his or
her position”). The use of caucus raises additional procedural justice and due process con-
cerns if it occurs in the context of “judicial mediation” or “med-arb;” if the mediator as-
sumes an adjudicative function, her decision-making may be affected by confidential
information she learned while in caucus—and there will not be the opportunity for the
veracity of such information to be tested. See Welsh, Magistrate Judges, supra note 37;
Tania Sourdin, Why Judges Should Not Meet Privately with Parties in Mediation but Should
Be Involved in Settlement Conference Work, 4 J. ARB. & MEDIATION 91 (2013–2014); Ellen
E. Deason, Beyond “Managerial Judges”: Appropriate Roles in Settlement, 78 OHIO ST. L.J
73. (2017).
151. See Welsh, Magistrate Judges, supra note 37, at 1035–1043, 1046–1060 (urging
feedback for federal magistrate judges who facilitate settlements, providing examples of
different means to provide feedback and opportunities for self-reflection, and providing a
sample feedback form); Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration of Mediation, supra
note 45, at 137–139 (describing courts’ systems for assuring the quality of mediation);
Welsh, et al., The Application of Procedural Justice Research to Judicial Actions and Tech-
niques in Settlement Sessions, supra note 37 (presenting and explaining a questionnaire
soliciting feedback from lawyers and parties regarding the procedural fairness and helpful-
ness of judicial facilitation of settlement); McAdoo & Welsh, Aiming for Institutionaliza-
tion, supra note 37, at 39–43 (recommendations for assuring effectiveness and quality of
court-connected dispute resolution programs and for resolving complaints about dispute
resolution processes); McAdoo & Welsh, Look Before You Leap, supra note 22, at 430;
Welsh, The Place of Mediation supra note 7, at 139–140 (expressing concerns regarding
many courts’ failure to monitor the quality of court-connected mediation programs).
152. For example, in the U.S. Postal Service’s REDRESS program, supervisors who
had participated in mediation reported that they had learned that it was important to lis-
ten, rather than immediately propose a solution or other response. See Jonathan F. Ander-
son & Lisa Bingham, Upstream Effects from Mediation of Workplace Disputes: Some
Preliminary Evidence from the USPS, 48 LAB. L. J. 601, 607–08 (1997); Lisa B. Bingham,
Employment Dispute Resolution: The Case for Mediation, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 145, 158
(2004).
153. It appears that these sorts of behaviors are likely to be perceived as collaborative
and procedurally fair, are likely to increase trust, and are likely to result in the provision of
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ingly, recent research also indicates that when a mediator models
reflective listening (or trustworthy consideration), this can enhance par-
ties’ ability to do the same.154 Other research, in the communications
context, has found that when meetings are characterized by a substantial
amount of checking for understanding of previous contributions, the inci-
dence of attacking or defensive behaviors is low.155 Meanwhile, people
participating in meetings characterized by substantial testing for under-
standing tend to judge these meetings as fair.156
If the mediator has developed a trusting relationship with the parties
and demonstrates that she cares very much about accurately understand-
ing what each of the parties has to say, then it appears to be more likely
that the parties will care about ensuring that they understand each
other.157
D. ONLINE TECHNOLOGY TO INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD AND
PRODUCTIVITY OF VOICE, TRUSTWORTHY CONSIDERATION,
AND REAL, SUBSTANTIVE SELF-DETERMINATION
Some have also suggested that those who are hesitant to exercise voice
may be emboldened by the opportunity to participate in asynchronous
online mediation.158 There certainly is plenty of research and personal
experience demonstrating that people’s online voice can be different
from their in-person voice. Research has indicated that lower-status indi-
viduals, for example, are more willing to participate in ”lean media” like
email and that social influence bias is reduced.159 People can also take
their time in composing messages, discerning the meaning of the
messages they receive, and making decisions about how to respond. In-
deed, a person’s written facility with language under these circumstances
may be quite different from her verbal facility with language in an in-
person meeting.
more information—thus making it more likely that parties will capture the integrative po-
tential of a situation. See Welsh, The Reputational Advantages, supra note 58, at 119.
154. See Administrative Office of the Courts, supra note 131, at v–vi.
155. See NEIL RACKHAM, MODELS FOR EXPLAINING BEHAVIOR: INTERACTIVE SKILLS
PROGRAM 56 (1995) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (defining “testing un-
derstanding” as behavior that “explores understanding of previous contribution,” “ties
down and clarifies points which may be unclear or ambiguous,” and “check[s whether]
people are seeing things [in] the same way”);  Nick Anderson, Meetings Bloody Meetings,
THE CRISPIAN ADVANTAGE (Feb. 19, 2010), http://thecrispianadvantage.com/meetings-
bloody-meetings/ [https://perma.cc/E5K4-7EHL].
156. See NEIL RACKHAM, MODELS FOR EXPLAINING BEHAVIOR: INTERACTIVE SKILLS
PROGRAM 56 (1995) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Nick Anderson, Meet-
ings Bloody Meetings, THE CRISPIAN ADVANTAGE (Feb. 19, 2010), http://thecrispi-
anadvantage.com/meetings-bloody-meetings/ [https://perma.cc/E5K4-7EHL].
157. See supra note 131. But see Wissler, Representation in Mediation, supra note 35
(reporting that mediation participants were less likely to indicate that they understood
each other better when they were represented by lawyers; the reason is unclear).
158. See Bollen, Ittner & Euwema, supra note 73, at 631.
159. See Noam Ebner, Anita D. Bhappu, Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Kimberlee K. Ko-
vach & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, You’ve Got Agreement: Negoti@ting via Email, in RE-
THINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING: INNOVATIONS FOR CONTEXT AND CULTURE 89, 96
(James R. Coben, Giuseppe DePalo & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2009).
758 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
Some dispute resolution organizations actually facilitate an online pre-
mediation exchange of information between the parties by requesting
that parties respond online to a series of questions and then allowing the
parties to see each other’s answers. Thus, these online providers facilitate
a form of voice and trustworthy consideration.
Less dramatically, asynchronous online communication may play a
helpful role as a component part of in-person mediation. For example,
researchers have examined the effects of including an online intake pro-
cedure before face-to-face mediation (i.e., e-supported mediation) in the
context of the workplace, with presumed hierarchical differences between
supervisors and subordinates. The particular intake procedure that was
examined “encourage[d] both parties to reflect on the issue at hand, the
accompanying feelings, the underlying interests as well as potential solu-
tions.”160 According to the researchers, these online tools “provide[d]
parties with an opportunity to tell their side of the story via asynchoro-
nous typewritten messages (e-mails); [and] it help[ed] parties to get some
insight into the situation at hand, and their needs and interests as well as
the needs and interests of the other.”161 The researchers found that in the
face-to-face mediations preceded by the online intake procedure, subor-
dinates did not differ from superiors in their satisfaction with the media-
tion outcome or the mediation process. This was in marked contrast to
face-to-face mediation that was not preceded by a preparatory online in-
take procedure, in which subordinates felt less satisfied with the media-
tion outcome and the mediation process.162 This research suggests that an
online intake procedure, with carefully-crafted questions, may be used to
achieve some of the same goals as pre-mediation caucusing, described
earlier.
In addition, online tools may help to ensure real, informed self-deter-
mination in mediation. There is research indicating that the widespread
use of smartphones (in contrast to computers) is bridging the digital di-
vide that has existed between men and women, between racial groups,
and between rich and poor.163 If this is so, then widespread online access
to information—such as that regarding legal rights and defenses, availa-
ble procedures, available dispute resolution providers, and outcomes in
160. Katalien Bollen & Martin Euwema, The Role of Hierarchy in Face-to-Face and E-
Supported Mediations: The Use of an Online Intake to Balance the Influence of Hierarchy, 6
NEGOT. & CONFLICT MGMT. RES. 305, 307 (2013).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 312.
163. See SCHMITZ & RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE, supra note 96, at 19 (citing to data
from the Pew Research Center showing “smartphone usage has created new means for
accessing the internet, especially for minority groups and those with lower economic
means. For example, 10% of Americans do not have home broadband internet access, but
they do own a smartphone. Smartphones also virtually eliminate the digital divide among
races and ethnicities, with 80% of “White, Non-Hispanic,” 79% of “Black, Non-Hispanic,”
and 75% “Hispanic” having some internet access through home broadband or a
smartphone. Still, smartphones widen the digital divide between 18–29 year olds and those
who are over age 65 (increasing from a gap of 37 percentage points in home broadband
access to 49 percentage points when taking smartphones into account).”).
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comparable cases—may create the potential for both increased access to
justice and more informed self-determination. Legal service providers in
the United States already are experimenting with the provision of such
information to their clients and self-represented litigants using artificial
intelligence, online videos, online legal libraries, and many other tools.164
Online tools also may have an important post-mediation application.
For example, online publication of information regarding numbers of me-
diated cases, settlement rates, procedural fairness perceptions and even
aggregated substantive outcomes with status-based breakdowns, would
provide some degree of transparency and contribute to trust in the proce-
dural and substantive fairness of mediation and the avoidance of systemic
but under-the-radar discrimination.165
More generally, many are now advocating for online dispute resolution
(ODR) in order to increase access to justice by reducing costs and time to
disposition.166 Thus, ODR may be in the process of becoming the “new”
mediation,167 just as mediation has become the new arbitration168 and
arbitration has become the new litigation.169 Like the processes that came
before it, however, ODR is very likely to need to embrace procedural
safeguards and transparency in order to assure people of both procedural
and substantive justice.170
164. The Legal Service Corporation’s annual Technology Initiative Grants Conference
provides an opportunity to explore all of these futuristic options. See also ETHAN KATSH &
ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTERNET OF DIS-
PUTES 157–158 (2017).
165. See Nancy A. Welsh, Class Action Barring Mandatory Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbi-
tration Clauses: An Example of (and Opportunity for) Dispute System Design?, 13 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 381, 430-431 (2017) (imagining an online dispute resolution process for busi-
ness-to-consumer disputes that provided consumers with access to information about their
rights and defenses, substantive and procedural safeguards, aggregated information regard-
ing consumers’ perceptions of fairness and substantive results, and impressive compliance
with results).
166. See Rebecca Love Kourlis, Natalie Anne Knowlton & Logan Cornett, A Court
Compass for Litigants (INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM, July 2016) (proposing use of technology and ODR for family disputes); ABA
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES, REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2016) (calling for the piloting and expansion of court-
annexed online dispute resolution systems); SCHMITZ & RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE,
supra note 96; Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, Digital Justice, supra note 165, at 158-165; see
also Zena Zumeta, Profiles in ADR: Douglas Van Epps, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2017,
(foreseeing the use of ODR for small monetary disputes, but continued use of in-person
procedures like mediation for disputes involving relational or emotional issues).
167. Interestingly, Ethan Katsh and Orna Rabinovitch-Einy are referring to ODR as
the “new new courts.” See Orna Ravbinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, The New New Courts,
67 AM. U. L. REV. 165 (2017).
168. See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “New Arbitration”, 17 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 61 (2012).
169. See Tom Stipanowich, supra note 23.
170. See Nancy A. Welsh, ODR: A Time for Celebration and the Embrace of Procedural
Safeguards, Conference Presentation at the 2016 International Forum for Online Dispute
Resolution, The Hague (May 2016) [hereinafter Welsh, Time for Celebration] (transcript
available at www.adrhub.com/profiles/blogs/procedural-justice-in-odr) [https://perma.cc/
8NNA-VETM] (calling for algorithmic audits and alternative forums for those who do not
have access to, or facility with, online options); see generally Noam Ebner & John
Zeleznikow, Fairness, Trust and Security in Online Dispute Resolution, 36 HAMLINE J. PUB.
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E. EMPOWERING MEDIATORS TO AVOID UNCONSCIONABLE
UNFAIRNESS OR COERCION
Ellen Waldman, Lola Akin Ojelabi, Jennifer Reynolds, and other
scholars increasingly express concern that even if mediation sessions pro-
vide for voice, trustworthy consideration, even-handed treatment, and re-
spect, they also have the potential to produce unconscionable outcomes.
Waldman and Ojelabi do not urge that mediators should therefore im-
pose their own solutions and definitions of fairness upon the disputants.
However, they do advocate for mediators’ ethical responsibility to assist
the “have-nots” and at least question outcomes that are so lopsided that
they appear unconscionable or patently unfair.171 This is likely the most
controversial suggestion contained in this Article, but there is precedent
for imposing some ethical obligation upon mediators to avoid extreme
substantive unfairness in specified contexts.172  It is also relatively easy to
L. & POL’Y 143 (2015); Noam Ebner & John Zeleznikow, No Sheriff in Town: Governance
for Online Dispute Resolution, 32 NEGOT. J. 297 (2016); Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Robert
Dingwall, Negotiating with Scripts and Playbooks: What To Do When Big Bad Companies
Won’t Negotiate, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S DESK REFERENCE (Christopher Honeyman & An-
drea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2d ed. forthcoming); Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh,
Digital Justice: Reshaping Boundaries in an Online Dispute Resolution Environment, 1
INT’L J. ONLINE DISP. RESOL. 5, 28 (2014); Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford,
Technology, Ethics, and Access to Justice: Should an Algorithm be Deciding Your Case?, 35
MICH. J. INT’L L. 485 (2014); Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations:
Separating “Haves” from “Have-Nots,” 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411(2014); Suzanne Van
Arsdale, User Protections in Online Dispute Resolution, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 107,
128–29 (2015); SCHMITZ & RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE, supra note 96 (noting: “[O]ur
enthusiasm for building these new dispute resolution mechanisms should not overshadow
our focus on principles of justice and ethical judgment. Those concerns must remain para-
mount. Indeed, justice and fairness must be at the core of not only the design phase of THE
NEW HANDSHAKE, but also the ongoing evolution of these systems.”).
171. See Ellen Waldman & Lola Akin Ojelabi, Mediators and Substantive Justice: A
View from Rawls’ Original Position, 30 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 391, 420–30 (2016)
(using Rawls’ “veil of ignorance” as well as ethical codes that permit mediators to with-
draw due to concerns regarding unconscionability).
172. In some settings, for example, mediators are obligated to avoid unconscionable
settlements. See Wissler, Representation in Mediation, supra note 35, at 435 (citing MODEL
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, §§ I.A, II, VI.A. (AM. ARB. ASS’N ET AL.
2005); ABA MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION
§§ I, IV (2001) [hereinafter ABA MODEL DIVORCE MEDIATION STANDARDS]; MODEL
RULE FOR THE LAWYER AS THIRD-PARTY NEUTRAL r. 4.5.3, 4.5.6 & cmts. (CPR-GE-
ORGETOWN COMM’N ON ETHICS AND STANDARDS IN ADR); NAT’L STANDARDS FOR
COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS §§ 8.1.f, 11.1 & cmts. (CTR. FOR DISPUTE
SETTMENT, INST. FOR JUDICIAL ADMIN); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in
Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 775, 787 (1999); Leonard Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in
Mediation, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 329, 349, 354 (1984); Welsh, The Thinning Vision, supra note
4, at 15, 78–84); see also ABA MODEL DIVORCE MEDIATION STANDARDS, §§ XI, 25.4 (“A
family mediator shall suspend or terminate the mediation process when . . . the participants
are about to enter into an agreement that the mediator reasonably believes to be uncon-
scionable.”); Robert A. Baruch Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A Study of
Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications 13–19 (1992); John Lande, How Will Lawyering
and Mediation Transform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 878 (1997); Craig A.
McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring
Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1332–33, 1397–98, 1405–06 (1995);
Nolan-Haley, supra, at 811, 836; Pincock & Hedeen, supra, note 85, at 444–47 (discussing
2017] Do You Believe in Magic? 761
understand how such an obligation would make it more likely that
marginalized parties would perceive the mediation process as offering at
least minimal assurance that they and their claims will be treated in an
even-handed and dignified manner.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article began by recounting the dreams and noble intentions that
inspired many of those who advocated for the institutionalization of me-
diation. Of course, powerful dissenting voices arose at the time.  Richard
Delgado was chief among them,173 and he continues to raise legitimate
concerns that must be addressed. Indeed, this Article has examined the
ways in which mediation has fallen short of achieving aspirational self-
determination and how and why inequality can undermine the ability of
mediation to assure a procedurally just process. Much of the research re-
viewed here is consistent with the social science research that Professor
Delgado and his co-authors invoked as the basis for their concerns re-
garding mediation. Thus, mediation has fallen prey to the same social and
economic problems that have afflicted (and continue to afflict) civil and
criminal litigation, administrative adjudication, and arbitration.174
This Article, though, is for those who have valued and continue to
value mediation for its potential to offer self-determination and procedu-
ral justice—its potential for a certain sort of magic—even while admitting
its shortcomings and acknowledging the need for reform. The research
described here, particularly regarding procedural justice, reveals that we
can and should take steps to increase the likelihood and productivity of
all participants’ voice, trustworthy consideration and real, substantive
self-determination by: increasing the inclusivity of our pool of mediators;
training all mediators to acknowledge and address implicit bias; training
mediators to engage in pre-mediation caucusing that focuses on develop-
ing trust; institutionalizing systems for feedback and quality assurance;
training mediators to model reflective listening; adopting online technol-
ogy that provides parties with the information they need to engage in
informed decision-making and the opportunity for self-analysis and self-
reflection; and perhaps even identifying additional areas of mediation
practice in which marginalized parties’ safety requires mediators to take
affirmative steps to avoid unconscionable unfairness or coercion.
theoretical developments regarding bullying, the related concepts of harassment and dis-
crimination, and the potential responsiveness of restorative justice).
173. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985).
174. See Michael Mofitt, Three Things To Be Against (“Settlement” Not Included), 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1245 (2009) (“We should celebrate the beauty in each process’s
internal narrative of justice, of truth, of efficiency, of predictability, and even of moral-
ity. . . . Both settlement and litigation fail on each of these measures with some reliability
. . . .”).
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It turns out that achieving the illusion of magic demands commitment
from us, and quite a lot of work. But it is work that can and should be
done.
